






Hugh Cecil Earl of Lonsdale.

1798.

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Dedicated to Field Marshal, His Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander in Chief, etc. By the translator, G. F. Koehler, Lt. Col., etc.

176



Light Dragoon Officer.

Monte Disney

REMARKS

late the property of his departed Friend A.B.

ON

CAVALRY;

BY THE PRUSSIAN MAJOR GENERAL OF HUSSARS,

WARNERY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL.



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1798.



TO

FIELD MARSHAL

His Royal Highness the Duke of York,

COMMANDER IN CHIEF,

Ec. Ec. Ec.

SIR,

THE universal admiration of your Royal Highnesses transcendant virtues, renders every attempt at panegyrick in this place superfluous ; it remains therefore only to observe, that every undertaking which has had for its object, the promotion of

b

the

the true principles of military science, has been constantly honoured with your Royal Highnesses approbation; should this hasty translation experience similar good fortune, the highest ambition of the Translator will be amply gratified.

I have the honor to be,

With most profound respect

And submission,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's

Most obedient

Humble servant,

London, March, 1798.

G. F. KOEHLER,
Lieut. Col. &c,

P R E F A C E.

THE high estimation in which the following remarks have been constantly held by several of the first cavalry officers, not only in our service, but in Europe in general, was the consideration which first induced the translator, as a military study, to undertake a translation of it;* and afterwards, by the advice and recommendation of
of

* Next to martial exercises, nothing conduces more to rouse the courage of a soldier, or
“ to make him better acquainted with the military art, than his employing the leisure of
“ winter quarters, and the many irksome hours spent in garrison, in the study of such
“ sciences as are most commendable and useful.” Buonamici’s Preface, Wars of Italy,
“ Book I.

“ None, I am persuaded, will be so unreasonable, as to blame me for employing the
“ little leisure a soldier can find from the duties of his profession, in study, reading, or
“ even writing, provided the subject be not incompatible with the character he sustains,
“ as that of this translation certainly is not.” Ibid.

several of his friends, to lay it before the public, more especially as the original has been some time out of print, and not to be procured, even in Lublin, the place where it was first published.

Like all other things founded upon solid and permanent principles, its reputation has been so far from diminishing, by the lapse of time, (being originally published in 1781) that it has on the contrary, only become the more approved in proportion, as it was more generally known. It is the work of a real officer of cavalry, who took the greatest delight in his profession, and distinguished himself very much in it. It would be an improper liberty to quote the authority of those excellent and distinguished officers of cavalry, in consequence of whose recommendation the present translation was put to the press; but it will be permitted to observe that it was not the least prevailing motive that the late Lord Heathfield, whose aid de camp the translator had the honor to be, always mentioned the original with peculiar approbation, as well as in general all the other works of the same author: These considerations, it is presumed, will be deemed a sufficient apology for the appearance of the present translation. It now only remains to solicit the indulgence of the candid reader, with regard to the style, to admit the importance of the subject as an excuse for the inaccuracies of the composition; if the sense of the original has been faithfully rendered, it is hoped that the graces of rhetoric will not be expected in this hasty military sketch.

With

With regard to the plates, it was long time a doubt whether to add them to the work or not, from the difficulty, time and expence, which it would require to procure proper engravings of the figures to be represented; but the translator having by him several hasty sketches which seemed to correspond very well with the work, and which he was advised to add to it, if possible, conceived it would be more acceptable to have them even in their present rough and unfinished form, than to be totally without them, more particularly as they are not intended as an embellishment: but merely as illustrations and explanations of the various species of cavalry employed in the different nations in Europe. It will therefore not be expected, nor is it intended, that they should in any manner, represent or explain the different exercises of the carbine, swords, management of the horses, &c. this would require a work peculiarly appropriated to that purpose, and totally different from the present, and was rendered the more impracticable and improper in the present work, from the sketches representing different nations, or different natures of troops in the same nation, each of which would have different manners of performing their exercise, and therefore rendered impossible to accomplish any regular or systematical representation of it, and it was thought more advisable not to attempt what would be inconsistent, and therefore improper. Those prints are therefore only intended to give an idea of the various natures of cavalry, in the European and other armies, so far as the translator had it in his power, in the present moment, to perform it.

It was intended likewise to have added some more remarks applicable to the service of cavalry, from the other excellent works of the same author : but not to procrastinate the present work, it was deemed more expedient to publish this separate, and afterwards, if that should appear desirable, to make a distinct work of them ; or to stimulate some other person more competent to the undertaking to perform it ; as it is conceived that every light thrown upon the subject of cavalry, by so excellent an author, who has joined practice to theory, and inculcates nothing but what he has actually seen performed, or bore a part in himself, cannot fail of being acceptable to every military reader ; particularly officers of cavalry.

The following description of the light cavalry, employed in the army of the famous Kouli Khan, appeared to be too apropos to the present subject to be omitted.

The Persian horses are large, and the horsemen commonly well made ; they wear great mustaches, and have, instead of a turban, a square bonnet a foot and a half high, covered with goats or tygers skins, that has the hair on it. To this turban is fixed a plate of bended iron, a foot long, with which they ward off the blows of sabres, by certain motions of the head, which they make with great agility ; their dress, which is red, green, or yellow, is wide and short, with large sleeves ; they have under this, a kind of shift, open on the breast, and use drawers, and leather boots. As for their arms, they consist of
a firelock,

a firelock, a hatchet, a sabre, and a buckler. These horsemen, with their accoutrements, which they know to be formidable to their enemies, marched boldly to them, as being sure of the victory. They attacked them wherever they met them, and sometimes pursued until they came under the battery of cannon. In several of those sallies, during fifteen days, Mohamed Schah lost above 50,000 men.

Translation, M. L. Abbé Lambert, vol. II. page 319.

Thamas Kouli Khan observed it as a maxim never to separate his troops, lest some detachment being beaten, the rest might be dispirited by that means. He used to say that the victorious, by slow marches, come up to the enemy, fly as fast as he can.—*page 209, vol. II.*

He set out with an army of no more than 20,000 men; there were only 12,000 of these regular troops, who wore coats of mail, covered with plates of brass; the rest were only valets, and young persons, whom they call Jelim, that is orphans, who serve but for little else than to ruin the country through which the enemy passes.

Translation M. L. Abbé Lambert, page 216, vol. II.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER.	PAGE
I. <i>Of Cavalry in general</i>	1
II. <i>Of the Formation or Composition of Cavalry</i>	22
III. <i>Of Intervals</i>	37
IV. <i>Of the Attack or Charge</i>	43
V. <i>Of Flanks</i>	51
VI. <i>Of the March, and the Deploy</i>	58
VII. <i>Of gaining the Flank of an Enemy</i>	66
VIII. <i>Distribution of Cavalry, in the line, and Corps de Reserve; and the Disposition of that Arm opposed to Infantry</i>	70
IX. <i>Of the Movements of Cavalry, in oblique Line</i>	81
X. <i>Of Cavalry and Infantry, combined in Corps</i>	85
d XI. <i>Of</i>	

XI.	<i>Of the Service proper to Cavalry</i>	-	-	88
XII.	<i>Particular Observations relative to Cavalry</i>	-	-	91
XIII.	<i>Of wheeling by Divisions, and by Fours</i>	-	-	98
XIV.	<i>Of the Caracol, or wheeling the Regiment in Line</i>	-	-	100
XV.	<i>Of Rallying</i>	-	-	102
XVI.	<i>Various Observations upon Cavalry</i>	-	-	104
XVII.	<i>The Points of Alignment, of View, and of Appui</i>	-	-	108
XVIII.	<i>Of the Alignment of Cavalry</i>	-	-	115
XIX.	<i>Remarks upon the Cavalry of the 15th and 16th Centuries,</i> <i>compared with the present</i>	-	-	118
Note		-	-	125

INTRODUCTION.

AMONGST the great variety of military books which have hitherto been published, very few throw any new light upon the service of cavalry ; a proof that the service of this nature of troops has never been sufficiently understood, and that it requires many talents, and military qualities, to become a great officer in it. It is not to be doubted, that for several centuries past, cavalry has very much degenerated, and it is only within these few years that its just principles have begun to be revived and applied, and which promises fair, soon to restore it to its ancient lustre, and pre-eminence. Formerly cavalry constituted the principal strength of an army, and all persons of distinction were ambitious to serve in it ; but the French Gens d'Arms having been frequently routed and dispersed, and at length totally defeated by the Swiss infantry, particularly at the battle of Novarre, seemed to establish a decided superiority of that arm over cavalry, and caused infantry, from that epocha, to be preferred, and cavalry consequently in European armies, to be neglected ; and from that time, until the reign of Frederick

Frederick II. cavalry, thus degenerated and neglected, rendered few services equal to what they had before been accustomed to perform, and it will appear in the course of the following remarks, that the very erroneous principles adopted by them, rendered their mode of fighting almost contemptible.

Several respectable military authors appear to have been entirely unacquainted with the importance, and advantage, of the services which might be rendered by that species of troops. Quinci, who has so much and so ill written, makes the exercise of cavalry consist solely in the caracol or wheeling in line, Birac, who is instructive enough in what relates to parties, detachments, and the service of light cavalry, in the *petit Guerre*, mentions it as an important consideration, that the trooper should be provided with boots and a cloak, a proof that they were in his time without them. Puissegur, who has treated most elaborately upon cavalry, has shewn that he was much less acquainted with that service than is required of a Subaltern officer amongst the Prussians.

Folard considers cavalry as almost a useless and inconvenient piece of furniture; it was however in his time, that the great Elector, Frederic William, with his cavalry alone, defeated the whole Swedish army, at Fehrbellin; and without cavalry, what advantage could Frederic have reaped from all his victories? It was his cavalry which in the two last wars rendered him the most important services, particularly at Strigau, Sohr, and Kesselsdorf, where they decided the fate of the action, by the impetuosity and courage of their charge; his Hussars did the same at Prague; the affair of Rossbach, was decided by a few squadrons, and Seydlitz, with cavalry alone, retrieved the fortune of the day, at Zornsdorf:

Zornsdorf; and saved the remainder of the infantry, at Hochkirch, &c. there are, however, not wanting, persons, who, without being well informed, pretend that the Prussian cavalry is not to be ranked amongst the best. It is not to be denied that they have been repulsed, and that sometimes, even after a successful charge; but it must be recollected, that an accident, a wing out flanked, a ditch, a cloud of dust, an appel or rally imprudently sounded; a sudden and inconsiderate movement, the fire of cannon, at the instant of the commencement of the charge, might happen to throw the best cavalry, for an instant, into disorder: besides, our cavalry (the Prussian) was every where, by half their number, inferior to that of their enemies, and reduced to the necessity of manœuvring in two ranks; but what, in my opinion, contributed most towards this want of success, whenever that was the case, was its charging en muraille, or without intervals, or at least with them too small: the King would have it so; but whenever the Generals were at liberty to leave reasonable intervals, it was always successful; this article will be hereafter more fully discussed. It is however incontestable, that most of the regiments have performed brilliant actions: and particularly the Hussars, under the command of General Seydlitz, who was, for so long time, their chief. This great man adopted, and introduced such alterations, and improvements, as entirely changed the nature of the service of cavalry in general: but more particularly of the Hussars; his system was peculiar to himself, and in which, he admitted nothing but the useful; and it is impossible to carry the perfection and superiority of that arm, beyond what he has done. The constitution of the Prussian army renders it however very difficult to instruct and train a soldier in it, to that perfection which is required by the reglement; half the soldiers being on furlough ten months in the year, they, during that time, forget what they had before been in-

instructed in, and at the time of their rejoining, preparatory to the reviews, they are almost as ignorant as recruits; an inconvenience which does not happen in those services where this æconomical arrangement is not established, and where the foldier can be maintained in continual exercise.

It is the system of the General before mentioned, which is intended to be observed in these remarks; the principles which he established, are of that General and permanent nature, as to be applicable to every description of cavalry, and enable each to act with the other, as occasion might require, or to perform separately and alone, the service proper to each; the cuirassiers with the Hussars, suppleness, activity, order, attack, disperse, appel, rallying, all is simplified and equalised amongst them. It was Seydlitz, who, after the peace of Dresden, began to unnumb and quicken the activity of the Hussars, to which nature of troops he was extremely partial; and they have hitherto been the only troops of that description which have been trained to perform the double service of regular cavalry and Hussars; except the Russians, who have begun in this to imitate them. The Prussian Hussars have charged in close squadron, equal to the best cavalry of any nation; and what have they not performed in detachments, and the *Petit Guerre*? This advantage can proceed only from the manner in which they are trained and exercised: for the troopers* in general consist of German Peasants, and are for the most part taken by force, from the plough, and their homes; almost all the officers are educated in their regiments, and except their ordinary exercise, and manœuvres, they learn very little in their gar-
risons

* In the course of this work, all the soldiers who are formed into troops, are called troopers, though that denomination is usually applied to heavy troopers only.

rifons and quarters; and it is very rare to find amongst them, men of polite education and manners. Their ideas in general does not extend beyond their profession: but it must be confessed, that they acquire a certain routine, which enables them to decide exceedingly well upon the most critical occasions, which can occur in actual service. Since Seydlitz has commanded the cavalry, the cane has very properly been almost forgot; every individual trooper ought to be personally brave, and to be animated with that noble ambition, which too much pains cannot be taken to inspire him with; to effect which, in some services, they are treated with particular respect; without this powerful stimulus they can find a thousand pretexts to evade doing their duty in presence of the enemy, and as many excuses are always ready; they can lay the blame upon their horses; whereas in the infantry it is much easier to oblige men to preserve their ranks and files, and to fire: if not to advance to the charge with the bayonet.

If a foldier, whether on foot, or on horseback, is not animated with ambition, if he has not that patriotick spirit, (the distinguishing characteristick of the English, and the Russians) he cannot be depended upon on any occasion where it is not sufficient to act mechanically; but where personal bravery is likewise requisite. The Prussians have not succeeded to form their cavalry to its present perfection, without great labour and perseverance; many nations have much greater facility of forming theirs the same, especially those where the system of furloughs is not adopted.

It was formerly imagined that a Hussar could not be good, unless he was an Hungarian; experience has however proved this to be an error, amongst the Prussian Hussars there are few, if any, of that nation;

nation; by perseverance and labour, men may be brought to perform whatever can be required of them, provided it does not exceed human capacity.

The ordinary exercises of cavalry will not be much touched upon, in the following remarks, there being already books which fully treat upon that subject; a very different one from what is denominated manœuvres. Exercise forms the soldier, renders a troop compact and dis-embarrassed in its movements; it consists principally in the different manners of breaking into column, of re-forming into line, of marching, and all the evolutions of the parade, rather than what is properly called manœuvres. Military exercise is every where almost similar, it is only necessary to observe, that it be performed with spirit, and accuracy, and as short as possible; that it might not require too much time, nor occasion unnecessary fatigue to the men or horses. The Russians have formed, of the least esteemed of their Cossacks, regiments of Hussars, who have made themselves to be respected by the Turks, which is certainly saying a great deal in their favour, and shews what might be done by system and method.

Exercise is properly only a preparation for the manœuvres, and as soon as a soldier is perfect in the former, he should be instructed in the other.

It is much to be regretted that a nation like Poland*, which possesses all that can be required to form excellent troops, as well infantry
as

* It is perhaps not necessary to observe, that the original of this Work was published previous to the change which has taken place in that country.

as cavalry, cannot maintain a number sufficient to establish order, support the impartial distribution of justice, and the internal regulations of police; but those who are acquainted with the form of that government know that the King, who commands only the four regiments of guards, has it not in his power. Prince Adam Czartoryski does every thing he can to restore the military reputation of his country to its ancient splendour, and with that intention has already expended very considerable sums of money; even the dislocation of Poland did not discourage him from his noble and patriotic resolution.

It is curious to remark the fluctuations of military reputation, in the different services of Europe. Formerly the Spanish infantry were the most esteemed, and now, perhaps without reason, their cavalry is preferred. In some wars, the Austrian cavalry has not distinguished itself so much as their infantry. The Hungarians were supposed to be proper for cavalry, or Hussars only; at present their infantry does not give place to that of any other nation.

And it might be justly affirmed without prepossession or prejudice, that towards the end of the last war, the King of Prussia received more decisive services from his cavalry than his infantry; although on his coming to the throne, the latter seemed to be superior to that of every other nation.

According to Philip de Comines, the Spaniards, in his time, had large horses proper for the Gens d'Arms, or heavy horse: those of the English, on the contrary, were so weak, as to be scarcely capable of being mounted by the archers; and in effect, in the battles between the Stuarts, and the Lancasters, all, even the Kings themselves, were obliged

to fight on foot ; at present we see the race of horses, in each of these nations, entirely changed. Two hundred years past, the Kings of France had scarcely any national infantry, and had recourse to the Swiss, the Germans, and even to the Italians for them ; at present the French infantry is supposed to be superior to the cavalry of the same nation : and in what small estimation was the Hungarian infantry held ? It was only in the reign of the Emperor Charles VI. that they began to be employed, and they are now supposed to be as firm, and steady, as any troops in the world.

It is proper to observe that these remarks were not written with the intention of their being rendered public, but solely for the instruction of some young persons of the first distinction, destined for the service of cavalry.



Sikh Officer

OF

CAVALRY IN GENERAL.

C H A P. I.

THE general term of Cavalry, as commonly received, comprises every description of soldiers serving on horseback; the different nature of which, both as to troops and horses, are further distinguished by the denomination of Heavy and Light.

The first consists in Cuirassiers, Carabiniers, Heavy Troopers, without cuirasses, and in some countries may be included the Dragoons; in a word, all that are mounted upon large horses.

The second includes the Light Horse, Hussars, Hulans, as also all the oriental cavalry, which lightly mounted, fight almost always without regular system or method; as Turks, Tartars, Calmouks, Moors, Cossacs, and other troops of the eastern nations, scarcely known in

A

Europe,

Europe, which are called irregular troops, and although divided into separate corps, or Cornettes, are proper only to lay waste a country, and by their numbers, to overwhelm some patrol, or small detachment, always avoiding to encounter regular troops formed into corps, and above all, never approaching infantry or cannon.

Cuirassiers differ only from the carabiniers and other heavy cavalry, in being armed with cuirasses; having besides, like them, straight swords, carbines and pistols, and a cross casque or iron callotte upon their hats; they are mounted upon large horses, and never fight on foot, but in cases of absolute necessity. The Austrians, the Danes, and some squadrons in France, have, or at least had a short time past, cuirasses before and behind. The English have done wisely to abandon the cuirasse entirely, and the Austrians have likewise quitted the one behind, and no doubt but all will follow in this, the example of the English cavalry. The cuirassiers of other nations have the plastron only: the brassards, cuissards, gantlets de lames and bottes ferrés, are entirely laid aside. The Austrians have yet in Hungary, complete armour for the head.

Dragoons, conformable to their institution, ought to be infantry mounted upon horses, that they might arrive with more expedition to the position on which they are to fight on foot; and in a battle they ought to form in line, and act with the infantry. Such was formerly the actual service of dragoons, or as they were then denominated, Arquebussiers on horseback.

It



Cuirassier



Warrior on Horseback



It is said to have been the famous Count of Mansfield who baptized them by their present name, without doubt upon comparison with those imaginary dragons which are represented as spitting fire.

About the middle of the last century the Swedes began to make use of them as light horse, to oppose the Croats of the Emperor, and at the beginning of this, they were mounted upon large horses, which have since been exchanged, after the example of the Saxons, for Polish horses, as light, strong, and excellent for all the operations of war.

The dragoons have preserved the bayonet, and the same arms as the infantry; the English and Hanoverians only, have the same as the heavy cavalry, and also trumpeters, in which they are right: for how can a drummer do his duty or defend himself on horseback. Dragoons ought to be exercised on foot, almost as well as infantry.

There was formerly in European armies, a species of cavalry called lancers: they were armed at all points; in France they were called *Gen's d'Armes*, they were all noble or lived nobly, but they could not be employed on all occasions, they were too expensive, each of them was obliged to have two horses for his own person, a large one for battles and tournaments, and another for marches and detachments; and besides these, one for the servant who had the care of them: and it was in consequence of the great expence that these troops were discontinued, when the armies were augmented. It is nevertheless certain, that the lance will always be the Queen of Arms for the defensive of this nature of cavalry.

Formerly cavalry was estimated by lances, and at one time a lance made ten horses, but this varied at different times.

The French dragoons have casques or helmets, resembling the ancient Romans, with a horse hair crest instead of a feather, formerly they had caps, similar to those of the grenadiers, which was intended to give them a martial air : but I am of opinion that nothing has a better or more military appearance for a soldier, than a hat. Caps, or helmets, &c. of whatever form, suiting certain faces only.

Before the end of the last century, Hussars were little known, except in Hungary, from whence they derive their origin, they then had clothes almost as ample as the Polish horse, and were armed like their Hussars. It is not an hundred years since they quitted the Pique and the Banderolle.

Hungarian Hussars was a National Militia attached to certain strong places, from whence they made perpetual incursions against the Turks, even in time of peace; by degrees, as the Emperor made conquests in Hungary, and had no farther occasion for all those fortresses, most of them were rased or fell into decay of themselves; from that time this cavalry was no longer necessary, and they were formed into regiments, which were employed in Germany, the Croats were sent home to guard their own country, and to re-people it: the Turks having almost rendered it a desert, by their frequent incursions for nearly a century.

The



Indian Hunter





The Croats were precisely what the Hussars are now, and rendered the same service in the armies; they were generally commanded by Italians, or officers natives of Italy, which is the reason there are found among them, as it is pretended, many families originally from that country.

The advantage of having Hussars with an army, being generally allowed, each Sovereign was desirous of having some squadrons of them in his service; at first none were admitted but Hungarians, deserters, or others, but afterwards, Germans were received, and in course of time, Poles; and when those corps were successively augmented, no preference was given to Hungarians, experience having proved, that it was not necessary to be born in Hungary to become a good Hussar. I am of opinion, however, that light dragoons would render the same service, in effect to what purpose to masquerade the natives of a country, by giving them a Foreign dress that is more expensive, and at the same time, the most inconvenient that can be imagined? The Austrian dragoons of Loewenstein, although newly raised, served equally well with the best Hussars; whose arms are, a large sabre, very much curved, a carbine and pistols: Polish, Tartar, and Moldavian horses, answer better for them than Hungarian, those being extremely degenerated within these fifty years; without doubt, for want of attention to procure stallions from Turkey, which are found to be the best in the Hungarian Haras (or studs,) and they never had any other, while the Turks were in possession of that country.

It is in the Hussars that the best officers of cavalry are formed, for this plain reason, that they are most frequently in presence of, and engaged with the enemy, often on detachments, charged with the execution of difficult and delicate enterprizes, affording them frequent

opportunities of exercising their capacities, and which obliges them to form their resolutions on the spot, and determine, without hesitation; the most important of all military qualifications.

The Prussian Generals, Seydlitz, Ziethen, Lossen, and several others of distinguished capacity, were taken from that corps. It might likewise be observed, that light infantry forms excellent officers of infantry. The Count Lascey served under that famous partisan, Franquini; General Loudon first began to make his great capacity appear, by serving amongst the Croats, and Wunch in a free corps; Count St. Germain was of the same opinion upon this article with myself. The King of Prussia was so fully persuaded of this, that he took officers from the Hussars, to place them in the heavy cavalry; and when he perceived that an officer of this had a genius for the other, he placed them there for some years at least.

Ulans are no where to be found, except in Poland, unless you assimilate them with the pretended Prussian Bosniacks; they have faithfully served the Kings of the House of Saxony, and the present one has three regiments of them in his service; they are well mounted and disciplined, and form an admirable corps of light cavalry: they ought to be all Tartars of Lithuania, brave, faithful, and steady, and by no means drunkards. There are however amongst them, a few Poles; the Republic has also a few corps or pulks, but they are by no means in the same order that the others are. They have preserved their ancient institutions; the Towarisch or Noble Comrades, have their Podflowy or servants, who are Poles; the Towarisch are the masters, and the Podflowy the privates, as formerly in France, the latter perform the ordinary service. From this originated the custom of
counting



Indian







counting by masters ; a hundred masters or lances, formed a thousand horse ; the arms of the masters are, a pike with a banderole, (or small flag) a sabre and pistols ; those of the servants the same as the Hussars. In an action the latter form in second line in two ranks, in small squadrons, and the masters attack or charge in single rank, which was the ancient custom amongst all the Gen's d'Armes.

The Turkish Spahis, those who receive pay, as well as the Sais and the Timars, although they have their standards, and their officers, are not armed uniformly, nor observe any regular order in fighting ; some of them have carbines and pistols, others have bows and arrows, as some of the Asiatics ; many have sagayes or javelins, of divers sorts ; long and short pikes with banderoles ; all have sabres or swords, some of the latter of which, are six feet in length, and are carried hanging at the saddle bow, hammers or pole-axes, such as were formerly used in war to break the armour of the cavaliers when unhorfed ; a few of them have defensive armour, which consists in a coat of mail or chemisette, a scull-cap of iron, with oreilards, brassards, and gantletts, such as was formerly the armour of our light horse. The Spahis have likewise bucklers of different forms, of wood and of rushes, covered with leather.

The Cossacks have pikes without banderoles, pistols at their belts, and carbines. The Calmoukes are the remains of the ancient Huns, they very much resemble the Tartars, notwithstanding they are not classed into odas, chambers, or cauldrons, as they are ; they are however armed like them, and have no other music than that of their Prince, in which they resemble Cossacks, who perform all their military expeditions with silence. The arms of the Tartars are bows and arrows,
some

some firelocks, a few pistols, and the sabre; some Hordes have pikes, with a tuft of hair in the form of a banderole.

The carbiniers ought, agreeable to their institution, to be armed with rifle carbines, but in several services they have been taken from them, because it was found by experience, that on horseback, they had very little advantage, if any, over others. In France there is a small number of carbiniers in each company or troop, who still retain them. The Austrians and Saxons have likewise in each regiment of cuirassiers, a company of carbiniers, who have rifle carbines; at present the Austrians have formed them into separate corps. In the Russian service there are a hundred squadrons of them, who resemble the cuirassiers in every respect, except that they have neither collars nor cuirasses.

It appeared useful to enter into this short description of the different species of European cavalry, to shew in what they consist, how armed, on what nature of service each should be employed, and what nature of arms are proper to be opposed to them.

Cavalry is divided into squadrons, as infantry is into battalions; a squadron is from 100 to 200 horse; and a battalion from 500 to 1000 men; five squadrons in the Prussian service forms, and is called a battalion of cavalry, because in effect it forms exactly one when they serve on foot. In that service there are regiments of one battalion, and others of two: that is to say, of five and of ten squadrons; regiments not being then of the same strength, and the squadrons being almost always so in every service, it would be a great error to judge of the strength of an army by the number of regiments of which it was composed;

composed; that is a fault into which many very respectable authors have fallen, we must therefore estimate the strength of an army by squadrons and battalions.

Squadrons are sometimes augmented to 200 horse, though they at present consist of no more than 150; and it is to this number which we must adhere, as well as to 750 men for a battalion, as being a just medium. I will explain the reason why that number ought to be observed, and the advantages which result from having them thus strong: A single regiment of ten squadrons, is preferable to two regiments of five squadrons each: in the first there is more union, uniformity, and esprit de corps; they are accustomed to the same word of command, and to act in larger bodies; they have an interest in supporting each other, without jealousy; and what is most essential, they will always be better formed to great manœuvres than smaller regiments.

However well two regiments of five squadrons each may manœuvre separately, the superiority of that of ten would be very perceptible, by uniting the two smaller regiments, and manœuvring them as a single corps in presence of the single regiment of ten squadrons. Also more extensive manœuvres can be performed with ten squadrons, than with five. The King of Prussia was so convinced of this, that he made, in consequence, the following arrangements, two months before the reviews; when the soldiers who had been on furlough, (*burloubté*) rejoined their corps, the troops were exercised by squadrons, in their quarters, for the space of ten or twelve days, after which, the regiments assembled and cantoned in large villages in the neighbourhood of each other, where each regiment ex-

exercised complete for one month: afterwards they changed their quarters, two regiments joined and manœuvred together, and when that could be conveniently done, a regiment of cuirassiers was joined with one of dragoons, or hussars, to equalize them: They reconnoitre, alarm, and attack each other reciprocally, until the time arrived for all the troops to assemble at the encampment, they then worked without interruption for some days; not in small corps, but in great orders of battle of every description: attacks, retreats, oblique lines, upon all natures of ground, patrols, convoys, foraging parties, nothing was there omitted of all the operations on actual service in the field: It is thus that armies ought to be formed every where, and by these means young officers and soldiers would soon acquire the quickness, precision, and other qualities of veterans in the service.

The more officers there are in the squadron the better, but in an action there ought not to be at most more than three in front, the commanding officer of the squadron in the centre, and one on each flank, more would prevent the soldiers from fighting, and particularly if the shock or charge should not be given with rapidity; in these cases, their horses, either because they find themselves pressed upon before and behind, or because they are startled at the swords and the blows, throw themselves across the line of the charge, which not only renders it impossible for the officers to defend themselves, but also prevents several soldiers in the ranks from doing their duty against the enemy: it would therefore be better if the officers were in the front rank.

A short time before the last war the King of Prussia saw the necessity of this alteration, and since that time, much fewer officers have been
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lost than when they all fought in front of their squadrons : there must be some on the flanks, because from thence they are better enabled to observe what passes in the ranks, keep the soldiers to their duty, and the files closed, &c. for it is generally the flank files which begin to disband first, those in the centre not having the same facility to do so : there must likewise be an officer in the rear of the squadron with some confidential non-commissioned officers to prevent the soldiers from stragling in the rear, and quitting the squadron : the Prussian regiment directs them to be kept to their duty with the sabre if nothing less will do it. These officers have also the facility of rendering themselves instantly to any part of the squadron where their presence might be necessary, either to fill up an interval, to close files which might have been thinned, or to form a small reserve in the rear of any part of the squadron where they press too much ; for at the moment of the charge, the commanding officer of the squadron, and the officers which are before the front rank, can no longer see what passes in the squadron, they have enough to attend to their own persons, and to the enemy who fixes all their attention : and those on the flanks see those in their front only, or at most the files next to them.

Squadrons have been fixed at 150 troopers, exclusive of the officers and noncommissioned officers, because if they were stronger, they would be unwieldy and very difficult to manœuvre with precision and order, especially as the greatest force of cavalry now consists in its rapidity and vivacity ; it requires likewise a great deal more time and trouble to rally a larger squadron : if it consisted of 750 men as a battalion does, it would be impossible to do it in presence of the enemy, and this is the reason why a line of cavalry without intervals, or in *muraille* is objectionable and dangerous, if on the contrary the squadron was weaker,

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it would not be of sufficient weight or impulse in the charge, and would oppose too contracted a front to the enemy: to observe then a just proportion, it ought to consist of 150 men, or 50 files, in three ranks. It is against the Turks only that cavalry ought to form line entire without intervals, and then the infantry should be formed with them, and the whole manœuvre together, close, compact, and flow.

The arrangement of cavalry has frequently varied. Gustavius Adolphus formed his squadron in six ranks. Before Henry IV. of France, the Gens d'Armes fought in one single rank, and this custom has continued ever since the wars of Louis the second with Charles Duke of Burgundy, surnamed the Hardy, and it still continues, or at least ought to do so amongst the Poles, if they would act conformable to the institution of their arms: the servants formed also little squadrons in interline two deep, and these last mentioned, though lightly armed for those times, were notwithstanding more heavily so than our cuirassiers are now: those servants, or as they were called companions of succour, threw themselves sword in hand upon the enemy, the instant the Gens d'Arms or lancers had made an opening, this was also the method in which the nobles fought; for in those times all were obliged to serve either on foot or on horseback, this was the *ban* and the *arrear ban*.

The combat of cavalry was very sharp and brisk, nothing there mechanical, it was the point of honor which animated them, and a noble lancer would have been ashamed to have quitted his hold until he was unhorsed or broke his lance; as for wounds, being armed from head to foot, it was very rare to receive any, and in speaking of the combats of those old times, we say, there was so many lances broke.

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In the last century there was no established regulation for the attack of cavalry, sometimes it was done with the sword, at other times in distant carbine or pistol firing, without doubt, as caprice of the General or commanding officer dictated.

But the most usual attack of cavalry was thus : when two squadrons were in presence of each other, a few files were detached from the right flank of each, to skirmish against the others in their front, and after having discharged their arms, they returned to the left of their ranks, and were succeeded by others, and this was the practice amongst the Prussian Hussars not thirty-five years past. This skirmishing lasted a long time before they had recourse to their swords ; it is known that at the battle of the Dunes, the Spanish cavalry received the French with their muskets, and were of course soon overset by them.

Quinci relates that the Prince of Orange become King of England, having approached the French army, which was besieging either Namur or Mons ; Louis XIV. ordered that his cavalry should fight with their fire-arms, which proves how little he was acquainted with the service of that species of troops, and that he followed the established custom of fusilading at a distance, until one or the other gave way.

Charles XII. of Sweden, was the first who forbid his cavalry to make use of their fire-arms, above all in a battle ; the French and the Spanish imitated him in that soon afterwards, but the Germans, and particularly the Austrians, did not adopt it till very late, and that to their cost, the muskets were then very short, the same as some Prussian Hussars have them at this time ; and I am of opinion they exchanged them without any good reason, and that they will return into

fashion again; they were carried flung to the bandouliere, or cross belt, which was not inconvenient; whereas the long carbines are very much so, the muzzle must be put into a case or shoe, or have a swivel to sling them to the saddle, and in an action, being obliged to hook them to the belt, they were very subject to get out of order, and break, besides they cannot be leveled except with both hands, whilst the musketoon could be managed with one.

Formerly when two squadrons charged sword in hand, the most rapid pace was the trot only, here the largest horses afforded the greatest advantage over small ones; files were pressed together very close, which they were enabled to do, from the circumstances of all the troopers being furnished with strong and stiff boots, which with much reason in several services they begin to resume. The King of Prussia's Guards de Corps have them, as well as the officers of his regiments of cuirassiers; they must not however be too heavy, it is sufficient if their weight should not be so great as to prevent those who wear them from walking with ease.

The charge at the walk or trot, is at this time called the ancient attack of cavalry.

When the King of Prussia ascended the throne, he found his cavalry formed to this manœuvre, his horses and his troopers were colossuses they did not dare venture to walk on a bad pavement, or move on uneven ground. He soon perceived that this was good for nothing but parade, and not for service: and that both smaller men and horses would be more proper for that arm; convinced that the real advantage of a squadron consisted in the impetuosity of the flock, the
order

order in which it is given, and the dexterity in handling their swords. He rejected almost entirely the use of fire-arms on horseback, and followed the system of Charles XII. who one day threatened his drabans to take them entirely away, if ever they took it in their heads to make use of them; this I was assured of by an old General officer, who had served in that corps. On some occasions carbines are absolutely necessary, particularly in a retreat in presence of light cavalry, and in quarters.

Frederick abolished all fire-arm exercise on horseback, as loading by word of command, &c. It must be confessed that the fire of a squadron, which can be made by one single rank only, does not merit any attention to be paid to it; this observation, experience has confirmed, in more than a hundred instances, and I never saw a squadron fire, that was not defeated by that which charged without firing.

Without any intention to derogate from the merit of the late Field Marshal, Kevenhuller, it might be safely affirmed, that the instructions which he gave to his regiment of dragoons, was almost less than nothing, his broken or independant fire was only fit to frighten sparrows; and it is very certain that the fire of a squadron, at best, only tends to throw it into disorder, for if amongst a hundred horses, three or four only are unquiet or restive, when the carbines are cocked, it is sufficient to throw all the others into confusion, however well broke and exercised they may have been, and from that instant it is extremely difficult for the trooper to present his piece, and impossible for him to take any aim, or fire with precision.

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The Austrians gave carbines to the quarter masters, and non-commissioned officers, which had the disadvantage of engaging them to fire like simple soldiers, rather than to attend to their proper duty. In 1760, they gave pieces called traboucs or blunderbusses, with very wide muzzles, and which were loaded with ten or twelve small pistol balls, to some of the cuirassiers of the front rank, but the Prussians never perceived any effect from them.

Since the lance has been rejected, the sword is, without contradiction, the queen of arms for the cavalry; and it is upon that alone, that they should depend in action, until the enemy is dispersed: it is only then that they might be allowed to make use of their pistols. Opinions are very much divided with regard to the advantage or superiority of the edge or the point of the sword for cavalry in action; each have their advocates equally zealous, who produce such instances as are in favour of that they prefer: but after much reflection on this important subject, frequent observations of the advantages and disadvantages of each, and some experience, during many years actual service in the cavalry, I hope I shall be permitted to mention my reasons for giving a decided preference to the latter.

The point of the sword is more advantageous than the edge, because with it you can reach your enemy at a greater distance than with the other, the smallest wound with it renders the wounded incapable of serving during the remainder of the action at least; it does not require so much force to give a dangerous wound with a thrust as with a cut, and the effect of the latter is much more uncertain, unless it happens to be particularly well placed, which it is hardly possible to do, unless you have your enemy as it were under your hand: In
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short, if he has a helmet or hat, with an iron callotte upon it, with large sides, and firmly fixed to the head by a thong or strap, he can hardly be touched with the sabre, except in the arm. Charles XII. was so confident of the superiority of the point over the edge, that he gave all his cavalry very long swords, and so narrow, that they could be made no other use of than to thrust with the point; those of the Prussians are applicable to the service of both edge and point, but they appear to be too heavy. The King of Sardinia had the swords of his cavalry blunted and rounded at the point, to oblige the troopers to make use of the edge only. Between these two contradictory authorities, I think we may safely decide in favour of the Swedes, whose cavalry has performed such brilliant actions, whilst that of the Piedmontese, though well composed, have never very much distinguished themselves, either because they have not been sufficiently numerous, or because that the intersected nature of the country in which they served, did not permit them: besides, I am informed, they still continue to manœuvre in the ancient manner.

Speaking one day with his Majesty the King of Prussia, of this diversity of opinions, with regard to the edge or the point, he answered, " Kill your enemy with the one or the other, I will never bring you to an account with which you did it."

Experience has shewn, that forming cavalry six deep rendered one half of them useless, and that besides the impossibility of rallying them when thrown into disorder; the destruction made by artillery in such a mass was enormous. This led to the opposite extreme of forming in two ranks, but this is equally objectionable, and should only be done in case of absolute necessity; for the preservation of the soldiers is not

the principle object to be attended to in the field, but the more important one of defeating the enemy. Ranks should therefore be formed two deep only in presence of an enemy, which we may venture to dispute; or on some particular occasions, when it is necessary to present an extensive front, or in the disagreeable occasion of having too small a number of cavalry in the field, and the squadrons being weak; this was what the King of Prussia was obliged to do, much against his wish, in the war of 1756.

On the day of the battle Reichenberg, in Bohemia, General Macquire having passed the Neisse, below Kratzau, coming from Gabel, had cut us off from our waggons, which were marching from Zittau; he was in the rear of our army with 7000 men. At the moment we began to move forward to the attack, the author of these remarks then placed 600 Hussars and Dragoons, which were under his command, in a rank entire, by which General Macquire was deceived; he believed the others to be superior in numbers, and retired without attempting any thing. The Duke of Bevern condescended to acknowledge in a letter, written with his own hand, that to this manœuvre he was principally obliged for the success of that encounter.

A squadron ought certainly, except in the particular instances above-mentioned, to be formed in three ranks, the best regulated armies have adopted that order, a greater depth would be liable to the objections before mentioned, and a smaller number of ranks would not have sufficient strength nor weight, and would not be enabled to furnish the shock in charging: whereas in three deep the two rear ranks not only press the first forward, but prevent them from stopping, and any of the troopers from retiring: the horses themselves are eager to push forwards
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when they find those in the rear ranks pressing upon them, and reaching upon them with their fore feet.

A squadron formed in two ranks is very subject to waving, and much easier broken than one of three, which also must naturally have a greater weight in the flock, and be much more difficult for an enemy to penetrate, even should several of the front rank be fallen or disabled: for as it causes no opening in the line, the horse will not fail to advance even without his rider, feeling himself pressed on each side and behind, as it always happens: for a horse must be very much wounded to make him fall upon the spot. One without his rider, at Strigau, which had one of his hind feet carried away by a cannon ball, joined the left of the squadron, where he ran with the others during all the battle, although we were several times dispersed; at the sound of the call he always fell into the same place, which was, without doubt, the same that he had before belonged to in the squadron.

Another time a cuirassier's horse fell, in the grand attack at the exercise of Breslau, the cuirassier got him up again, and mounted him; at three hundred paces he fell down dead. The late General Krokou, Colonel of the regiment, had him opened, and it was found that the sword of the cuirassier had penetrated his heart a tenth of an inch. These facts prove that a horse is not easily to be brought suddenly down, unless a ball should break his skull.

A squadron of 40 or 50 files, in three ranks, is told off into four divisions (in general called Zuge,) and one of 34 and under, into 3; on a march, and on the parade, the officers fall in, in front of their divisions, but in manœuvring they remain upon the flanks, without
however

however being fixed to the one or the other, but are to move to that towards which the divisions are to form into line, or the proper pivot flank, that they may preserve the distances and intervals, and dress the line correctly, so that at the words, *halt front*, or *wheel into line*, the whole may be correctly formed in an instant, in its proper order, without requiring any alteration; that every one might, without moving, be in their proper place, which could not be so if the officers who led the division remained in the columns, or in the line, where they could only attend to those who marched immediately in front.

For instance, if the line has marched off the ground in columns by the right, the officer should march on the left flank of his division: and *vice versa*, should the column have marched off by the left. In this manner, without changing their place, or passing amongst the ranks or divisions in the column, they find themselves in their proper places as soon as the divisions wheel up and re-form the line.

General officers should place themselves in such situations as to be enabled to see, if possible, all the movements and operations of the troops under their command; every other officer should, at all times, remain at his post, whether on a march, at exercise, or in presence of the enemy; that they may be in readiness to correct any error in their movements, or in short, to give such orders as circumstances might require.

The commanding officer of a squadron being to direct it to the charge, he is in some sort responsible for its doing its duty in presence of the enemy; he should therefore not allow any person to interrupt or em-
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barras him, but to reserve his attention free and disengaged from every thing but the movements of the enemy, and the operations of his own squadron, as connected with the line or wing to which it belongs: He ought to move along the front of his squadron, from flank to flank, until the trumpeters sound the charge. He must then take his post, which is in front of the centre of the troop or squadron: From the moment that the line or wing begins to move forwards, it is no longer time to correct any thing in the ranks or files of the squadron, which is the reason that more good-will is required in the cavalry than in the infantry.

What has already been observed with respect to the position of officers advancing to the charge in front of their squadrons, is equally applicable to the fault which is committed in those armies where the General officers and staff, are accustomed to charge in the same manner, their destruction is almost inevitable, at the same time that it renders them incapable of attending to the more important duties attached to their charge, and reduces them to the situation of private troopers, who would acquit themselves much better in the manual exercise of their sabre than an old and perhaps infirm General, whose loss however might discourage the troops, and cause them to remain inactive during the rest of the combat.

These facts appear to be sufficiently important and convincing, to prevent any more than one field officer being placed in front of a regiment to lead it to the charge; the others, as well as the Generals, ought to remain in the intervals; and perhaps they would be better enabled to observe and correct any error in the move-

ments of the line by being a little in the rear of it. Such is really the duty of their place, and not to be sabring in the front like private troopers. What should we think of Generals, or superior officers of infantry, who would take firelocks and place themselves in the front rank, to make use of them against the enemy during an action; and yet this is precisely the same thing.



C H A P. II.

Of the Formation or Composition of Cavalry.

AN army might be considered as a machine, which is moved at will, and for the construction of which, it is not only necessary to have good materials, but to know how to form and put them in motion.

Let us premise, that in all countries, where the military are not distinguished, they never will or can have good troops: It was from the small estimation in which they were held under the last King of Spain, of the House of Austria, that the armies of that monarchy formerly so much admired, fell into such contempt. Those of Portugal had the same fate under the last King; those of Saxony, under Augustus III. and those of Denmark, under the grandfather of the

the present King; those of Poland, by the neglect with which they
 * have been treated since the time of Jean Sobiesky.

The spirit and discipline of an army is soon destroyed by contempt, but it is a work of time and great exertion to restore. If the military is not distinguished, what motives can engage persons of fortune and merit to enter into the service?

None but those whom misery pursue, would be in the right to engage in such a profession.

It is honour alone which can prevail upon persons in easy circumstances to embrace a fatiguing and painful way of living, with very little pecuniary advantage, full of dangers, and which in some sort deprives them of liberty; for subordination must there be observed rigorously, without regard to birth or protection; I would have a strict and severe discipline, but not slavery, which vilifies elevated sentiments. That principle is a bad one which would, without attention, animate men by the lash or the cane like horses. A soldier, and above all, an officer, must love his profession; but it is not the way to engage him to it by continual calling, and finding fault oftentimes without reason, as some commanding officers are fond of doing. The military may be rendered respectable, without relaxing in discipline, subordination, and respect.

For faults which are not criminal, they should not inflict chastisements which sullies his honour and his character: such as that of putting officers in irons to make them march at the cannon, even before the crime is enquired into.

Military

Military rank and titles should not be bestowed on improper persons, who ought rather to aim at distinguishing themselves by other means.

It should also be recollected, that every thing encreases in price, and consequently that the appointments and allowance of officers, who are obliged to incur greater expences than formerly, should not be diminished : that Captains at least should be in a situation to live commodiously, because a subaltern ought to look upon a company as a fortune to which he aspires, and for the acquisition of which, he must pass through many years of fatigue and dangers, apply all his attention, and exert all his faculties, in many trying and delicate situations, particularly in a service where military distinctions are not to be purchased or disposed of, like a mercantile commodity.

In the cavalry none must be engaged but young men of approved fidelity : and vagabonds or deserters never received, when it is possible to avoid it; in several services many regiments of cavalry fail in not attending to this advice.

Hussars, and all those who serve in the light horse, of every description, ought to be persons upon whom you can confide and depend : for besides that, at every moment they have it in their power to desert with horse, arm, and baggage ; it is often on their vigilance and fidelity which depends the safety of a quarter, and even of the whole army.

All nations have not the same facility of raising the requisite variety of cavalry equally excellent.



Royal Horse Guard



British Heavy Cavalryman



British Light Dragoon



The Spaniards and the Neapolitans have very good horses for actual service during an action: but they are said to be degenerating very fast, being all stone-horses, and fiery, they cannot support those long marches and fatiguing duties, which are unavoidable in the course of a campaign, and particularly in winter: neither the men nor the horses of these nations are proper for our climates.

The English have every thing which can be desired to form an excellent body of cavalry of every species; their light dragoons ought, and does, surpass every thing which we have ever seen of that nature; and as their cavalry is not numerous, they have the greater facility, in being select in their composition, both in men and horses, without being obliged to have recourse to other countries, or to look out of their own island; an advantage which few countries possess.

The French cavalry has been very much neglected, in time of peace a part of them is dismounted, which is not the method to improve them. In France, as every where else, the provinces which abound in fields and meadows, furnish the best materials for cavalry, whereas in a country of vineyards and manufactories, the peasant hardly knows what a horse is, therefore each of them ought to be appropriated to that service which is most natural to them; and soldiers for the cavalry chosen from a grass country, because the men and horses, which both grow there, are brought up as it were together; it was for this reason that the Austrians were always desirous of procuring Silesians for troopers.

The French must always continue to procure a considerable proportion of the horses for their cavalry from foreign nations, as they do at

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this time at a very great expence, unless they take to breeding more in their own country than they have hitherto done. It will always be very difficult for them to maintain many Hussars and light dragoons, because being too far from the countries, from whence they procure the horses proper for that species of troops, they cannot re-mount them without great difficulty and expence.

In those services, where the captains furnish the horses for their own troops, the trooper is a better groom than soldier; no cavalry of that description will ever be properly dressed to grand manœuvres, which as it ruins many horses, the captain to whom they belong, is interested in sparing them as much as he can; besides their appointments are not in any service adequate to such heavy expences as they would by that means be obliged to incur.

The House of Austria, as well as the other Princes of Germany, France, and Sardinia, procure horses for their curiaffiers, and other heavy cavalry, from Lower Saxony, particularly Holstien, and from Friezeland, which are not the most approved: but where are better to be procured? Austria has, in her vast estates of Germany, enough large and strong horses, but they are more proper for draught than the saddle; it would be easy to remedy that by procuring stallions from other countries, after having made experiments which would most improve the race of horses intended to be bred. The Swiss afford an example of this kind, before the last war in Italy their horses were the worst in Europe: but when the Spanish army marched into Savoy, a great many Dragoons and other troopers, who are in general mounted upon stone horses, having deserted to them, the Swiss purchased their horses, and I am assured that they have at this time a breed of horses,
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very proper for the service of cavalry, but it is very certain that they will again degenerate unless they continue to supply their studs from the same, or other foreign countries.

Notwithstanding that the states of the King of Prussia furnishes pretty good horses, that Monarch does not make use of any of them in his army, he purchases those for his cuirassiers in Holstien, and those for the Hussars and Dragoons, are procured from the Ukraine; within these few years arrangements have been made to breed horses in Silesia, proper for the cuirassiers, but I very much doubt their success.

The Danes and the Hanoverians have the finest horses of the north, and they are very high priced, but as the troop horses are the property of the captains, their cavalry is not superior to those who are not so well mounted, for the reasons before suggested. The Swedes and the Norwegians, have nothing but nags: The Russians, by establishing good studs, or studs, have succeeded to breed a sufficient number of horses very proper for their cuirassiers, and carbiniers; they are not fine, but are strong and more durable than those of Holstien, from whence they still continue to procure some; in doing which, General Seidlitz was of opinion they were wrong: horses proper for mounting Dragoons, Hussars, and other light cavalry, being abundant in their own meridional provinces.

Marshal Schwerin told me that when the King of Prussia augmented his Hussars, by the numerous corps which he raised in addition to the six squadrons only, which he had when he came to the throne, he had proposed to the King to form regiments of Light Dragoons, and
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in my opinion he was not in the wrong, agreeable to the trivial proverb,
 “It is not the dress that makes the man.”

For a foldier to be really a light horseman, he must be able to turn his horse quick and short, when in full speed, to raise up and catch any thing from the ground ; he will find himself much firmer in his seat, have greater command of his horse, and much more agility in the exercise of his arms, &c. by being mounted on an eastern saddle, that is to say, upon a Hungarian, Turkish, or Polish one ; to those who have been accustomed to other saddles, they appear at first to be inconvenient, but they very soon find themselves perfectly at ease in them, and ever after, prefer them to all others ; they are very light, cheap, and durable, and do not so often require repairing as the others do. (*See the plate.*)

The service of light horse requiring them to be as it were always in presence of the enemy, and ready to mount on horseback in an instant ; they ought not to have either breast-belts or cruppers to their saddles, which will enable them to saddle much quicker than they can do otherwise : besides, as the saddles above described have double girths, they are sufficiently firm without them.

A light horseman ought to be careful not to overburthen his horse, as the Saxons are accustomed to do ; a shirt or two, and a few other small necessary articles ; a nose bag to give oats to his horse, in which the implements for dressing him are put, is all that should be allowed ; in fact, to what useful purpose are all those ample Hungarian holsters ; those enormous broad cross belts, echarpes, and fabletaches, and those other ornaments of the Hussars, loaded with buttons, plates, cords, and



Harrieh Horse

and tassels, unless to create expence to the Sovereign, and incommode the man and the horse? except in the King's horse guards, every appointment of the cavalry should be plain: besides that, these ornaments of lace, &c. cost a considerable sum of money, which might be applied to more useful purposes: they are soon worn out, and resemble fringes of rags, and look pitiful; nothing is more proper and soldier-like for a trooper, than a simple, plain, and neat equipage, which it is not possible to have for any length of time, whilst covered with all this frippery, more proper for the dress of a lackey, than that of a soldier.

A good goat or sheep's skin, should be used instead of a housse, they will cover at the same time, the pistols and the portmanteau; the bridle also ought to be as light as possible, without any unnecessary buckles or straps; there should be but one attached to the pommel of the saddle, to strap on the cloak rolled up before the trooper, which will be very important, to protect his belly from a thrust with the bayonet or sword, the stirrups should be bronzed; and by these means, the trooper, on his arrival at camp or quarters, has but few straps and buckles to clean. He covers his arms, accoutrements, &c. with the goat-skin, and has time to attend to his horse and himself; in short, every thing should be light and proper, without affectation. I have been informed, that except as to the saddles, the English regiments of Eliott, and Burgoyne, are thus equipped.

The Hussars do not require tents, and the Dragoons might do equally well without them, no light troops are better appointed or more active or allert on horseback, than the Polish Ulans: the equipage and appointments of the Ulan and his horse, are admirable, commodious and proper: and although I am not very partial to those of

the Hungarians, yet I am persuaded it is very proper for several nations, particularly those in which it is the national dress.

In every species of cavalry the man ought to be proportioned to the size of his horse, and the arms with which he is to serve; adapted and proportioned to them both, and the nature of service to be performed; consequently the cuirassier should be larger, and his arms heavier than the dragoon, and those more so than the Light Horse or Hussars; a small man has great difficulty to mount a large horse, particularly with a cuirasse, they should all however be muscular and robust, but not heavy; the Prussian Dragoons are too heavy for their horses, and it is ridiculous to see a large man upon a small horse: which by being strained with too much weight, is very soon ruined, and the trooper dismounted; a man who is more than 5 feet 8 inches, ought not to be received into the cavalry, but will find his proper place in the infantry.

When a recruit is enlisted he is taught to hold himself upright, to march with an easy air, and to shake off the lounge of the peasant; he is taught the exercise of the broad-sword, with small basket-hilted sticks; nothing contributes more towards rendering him active and dexterous; he is exercised on foot, until he is sufficiently prepared to begin it in the squadron. Whatever may be said, I hold it very essential, that cavalry soldiers, and particularly dragoons, should be acquainted with the exercise on foot, almost as well as the infantry; but always in two ranks, as the cuirassiers; they may also preserve their bayonets, provided they are not too weighty: the English and Hanoverians have taken them from their cavalry. It is however very advantageous that cavalry should be enabled to defend themselves at all times, and even on foot, if necessity required it, and it might be proved
that



Hulan Trotting

that such occasions have, at all times, in every service, occurred with every nature of cavalry.

It will be found very useful to practice on foot, at least once, any manœuvres which you would perform with the squadron, before you try them on horseback, this not only saves the horses, but very much assists the ready and correct conception and execution of it, particularly should it be an intricate or complex manœuvre.

When the recruit is sufficiently instructed on foot, he is mounted upon a wooden horse, much like those made use of in riding-schools for vaulting, but it must have a neck and head, to fix a bridle to; there should be two of those horses per troop, the recruits must be instructed by them how to place the saddle on their horses, to mount and dismount on both sides, with or without stirrups, how to fold his cloak, to put on his baggage, and a truss of forrage, to vault into the saddle without aid by the croup, that he might be enabled to do it on his horse, without having occasion for a knot instead of a stirrup; he must be exercised to bend forward and take his hat from the ground; to dismount, to stand and hold the bridle properly; in a word, every thing but vaulting; to place himself in every position of the exercise, to draw, handle, and return his sword; to load and fire his carbine and pistols; and to exercise and make use of his arms with spirit and address: this is the manner in which recruits are formed in the service, and is very nearly the same that is recommended by Vegetius.

These two wooden horses should be placed as in a rencounter, on the right hand of each other, and those that are upon them should thrust and cut with the point and with the edge, with
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basket-hilted flicks, and they should be taught all the guards, to ward off, and to parry the same.

A foldier should not be taught to ride as it is practised by professed riding-masters, because the greatest part of the aids given by them must be with the bridle, which for that purpose must be held short, but without stiffness, the left shoulder a little forward, extending his hand in an easy manner to the mane of the horse ; a trooper in the ranks can give false aids only with his legs. When he has been properly exercised in this manner, his horse is given to him, and he is quartered with a non-commissioned officer, or some old steady trooper, who is to shew him how to take care of his horse, how to saddle and to bridle it, to comb his mane without tearing out the hair, and never to touch the tail but with his hand, to wash it once a week, and after the new moon to cut the points of the hair ; experience has proved this to be the true means of preserving that fine ornament of a horse.

He is also to be shewn how to take care of his arms and accoutrements, saddle and bridle, &c.

The officers should assist in teaching him to ride ; the riding-master cannot attend to all the recruits : besides, he is in general fully occupied in breaking horses, &c. for the officers.

Every thing should now be taught the recruit which might be requisite on actual service, very near the exercise of the caroufel, except the exercise of the javelin, which would be useless to him. He ought to be able to turn his horse suddenly upon his haunches, to run at
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the ring with his sword instead of a lance, which very much supple the horse, and forms the trooper to dexterity and firmness in his seat, without however attending to all the minutia required in the riding-academies.

Each garrison should have a covered riding-house to exercise in during the winter, but it is of course impracticable where the troops are dispersed about in villages, which is certainly very prejudicial to them.

A squadron ought to be often exercised without saddles, and manœuvre every day at least half an hour: this is absolutely necessary, to keep the horses in wind, and to harden them; it is with them as with racers, if they are not kept in continual training, they are very soon incapable of performing the service required of them.

There are few horses but which might be made to run; when we had bought those which our Hussars had taken from the enemy, the greatest number of them were given in the re-mount; at first those troopers who received them were dissatisfied with their want of activity, but after having felt the Prussian spur for a few weeks, they were as fleet as the others.

As soon as the squadron is mounted the troopers are practised to leap ditches, enclosures, poles put across for that purpose, &c. at other times two troopers run together full speed, trying to get before and carry off each others hats; they are practised to swim their horses across rivers; to manœuvre in broken and intersected ground; to climb and descend heights; they attack in single ranks, cross hollow ways, villages, defilés;

defilés; in breaking off upon the division opposite to it, they form up rapidly, disperse, rally, &c. at other times they practise the posting of grand guards, and vedettes; they reconnoitre, scour the woods, retreat fighting, dismount and re-mount, deploy, and they must be made to trot a good deal, by which they will acquire a firm seat on horseback, and not to fall upon the saddle at each motion of the horse; they ought to ride with shorter stirrups than in the riding-schools, because they must be able to raise themselves four inches above the saddle.

There are targets to be fired at by the troopers, with their pistols, walking, trotting, and full gallop, and even in leaping over a bar.

When the squadron arrives at a ditch, the commanding officer gives the word *ditch*; (in German, *graben*) the two rear ranks, if they are in three, instantly halt, and the first springs forward and leaps it, calling out *leap*, and successively the centre and rear ranks, the horses, by accustomed to the sound of that word, very rarely fail when they hear it.

A head of felt, stuffed with wool or straw, is fixed to a branch or post, which the soldier is to touch with the thrust or the cut, both in passing and repassing, in full gallop. It would very much stimulate the soldiers to emulation, by attaching some gratification to those who acquit themselves with the greatest address.

They should frequently be made to move briskly forward, and then suddenly halted upon the spot; at the word *halt*, the trooper presses upon his stirrups, keeping his body a little backward, retaining the bridle by bending his wrist a little, but without moving his arm; by these means he puts his horse upon his haunches.

A squadron should be accustomed to move off its ground at once, and all the troopers to be in motion at the same instant, at the word of command, either at a walk, trot, or gallop ; they should even be made to traverse in line. It will sometimes happen that when they are not perfect in this exercise, some horses will receive atteintes, or blows with their fore feet, from the others, but the performance of this manœuvre on service, is too important to prevent their acquiring it under any apprehensions of this inconvenience. It is absolutely necessary that good cavalry should be able to traverse, and that they should move the whole line at the same instant, and not successively, as I have seen it practised by some which has rather the appearance of counter than traverse marching ; nothing can contribute more towards suppleing of horses than the traverse movement. It is pityful to see a squadron be obliged to break off by divisions to gain ground obliquely to the right or the left, when by traversing this is performed in an instant, and gracefully.

A squadron ought often to be exercised in a single rank, and to advance obliquely to the right and left, upon a variety of alignements and points of view, and appui, in a rank entire ; the faults are more easily discovered, and the trooper learns to march in line with more exactness : for which purpose more attention and accuracy is required, an extensive line in single rank being much more subject to waving than in two or three ; sometimes even the whole regiment should manœuvre in this manner.

Seidiltz communicated to me a project which he had conceived some years past, and which would then have been put into execution, but
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for the envious jealousy of some persons who by their intrigues traversed and prevented it; he had within his own inspection (and district) in Silesia; about an hundred young gentlemen belonging to the regiments under his command, who are denominated in the cavalry, (standards junkers) or gentlemen standard bearers; they are all noble (*i. e.* gentlemen) but have the rank, the pay, and the uniform of non-commissioned officers; in the infantry the two eldest wear the sword-knot the same as the officers. He had intended to have assembled them at Ohlau, his head quarters, and to have exercised, manœuvred, and formed them to the military evolutions himself; they were to have been likewise instructed in foreign languages, the mathematics, &c. and all the bodily exercises which form the accomplishments of a well-bred young gentleman, intended for the army.

On the assembling of the regiments, two months before the reviews, each of them were to rejoin the regiments to which they belonged, in order to exercise with them. It is very certain these young gentlemen acquire no sort of useful knowledge in the small garrisons to which they are usually attached in the provinces; but on the contrary, their morals are in great danger, at that early period of life, of being corrupted, by passing too much of their time in taverns, or coffee-houses, or in low company; whereas with Seidlitz, they might have made a great progress in every science and exercise, proper to form a gentleman and a soldier, and the whole expence to the King would not have exceeded fifty ducats per month, for the salary of the teachers, &c. this arrangement, had it taken place, could not have failed to have been very advantageous, and would be equally so in every service, where it is desired to have a good corps of cavalry.

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Something of this kind was likewise proposed at Varsovie, but which from similar obstacles, had the same fate: for it is difficult to render a Polish noble or gentleman, susceptible of discipline in his own country; abroad he is excellent and admirable: but in Poland, that spirit of liberty, or rather licentiousness which pervades every thought and action, prevents him from submitting to the smallest inconvenience.

C H A P. III.

Of Intervals.

MUCH has been said on both sides for and against intervals, but nothing seems hitherto to have been decided to the satisfaction of all parties; it would be presumption to suppose that any thing which can be here adduced, will have better success: but yet it might be useful to exhibit the reasons which seems to make it rational and advantageous to adopt the practice of allowing intervals between squadrons, and to explode the pernicious custom of manœuvring en muraille.

The idea of cavalry charging en muraille, is not of ancient date; the last war intervals were very properly left between squadrons; Prince Louis, of Baaden, was the first who ventured to abolish them, but only against the Turks: and in this, however contradictory it might appear, he was also right, for it is in fact against them only that a

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corps

corps of cavalry ought to be formed en phalanx; Lecaufe then it is of the utmost importance, to remain close, compact, and firm; advancing with a slow steady pace, the cavalry incorporated with the infantry, as is explained in the Treatise on the Turkish military, by the author of these remarks.

Puifegur, whose information with regard to the service of cavalry, was very superficial, would have it form similar to the infantry, en phalanx or without intervals, and proposes that both should march together with equal step, in line, to the attack of an enemy; he supposes that a line without intervals, encountering one which has them equal to the length of their squadrons, would have a certain advantage, by means of the squadrons opposite to the intervals, wheeling to the right and left by wings, (or half squadrons) and attacking them on each flank, at the same time that the squadron in their front attacked them straight forward: however plausible this may appear in theory, a little consideration will discover its serious defects: besides, a line with such intervals as therein premised, is almost as defective as that en murialle, and both ought equally to be rejected.

The King of Prussia appears at one time to have adopted the maxim of Puifegur, and that perhaps to his disadvantage, for whenever his cavalry has attacked in this manner, it has always been broken and routed by the enemy, and that frequently, even after a successful charge.

After the battle of Prague, a letter was written to the late General Winterfeld, to be laid before the King, with observations relative to this subject, but what effect it produced has not transpired.

A line of cavalry en muraille, even at exercise, cannot manœuvre without confusion; there would be no objection if it was made use of only there, for cavalry accustomed to manœuvre without intervals, will do it with much greater facility and precision, and find themselves very much at ease when they have them: It is however dangerous to accustom troops to manœuvre differently at exercise from what they are intended to do in presence of an enemy, as all officers who might have the command of troops under such circumstances, are not decided enough to adopt the variations proper to the service required. Some of them would not even reflect whether the manœuvres they had been accustomed to perform, were better than any other or not; besides, the effect that such alterations, at such a moment, might have upon the confidence of the troops.

Cavalry ought therefore to manœuvre on all occasions, both at exercise, as well as in presence of the enemy, with proper intervals.

First. Because a horse cannot turn upon the same space of ground that it occupies in the ranks, as a man can; the application of this rule will appear hereafter.

Second. A line en muraille rarely arrives to the position of the enemy in order, or rather it never does if the charge is brisk and rapid; the least obstacle in the way of any part of the line deranges it, and this disorder is immediately communicated to the whole, of which it forms a part.

It is scarcely possible for a line without intervals to advance for any distance without waving, the least accident throws it into disorder, whether the files press too much together, or whether they separate
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and form intervals, which they suddenly incline to close up again, they equally break the line, so that frequently a whole squadron is obliged to spring forward, or to fall back into the rear to make room ; and when the rapid part of the charge is began, it will be impracticable for them to attempt to re-enter. The charge must be given such as it happens to be: and if it should be successful even in the first shock, the causes above-mentioned will operate to throw it into such confusion, as to prevent their taking the proper advantage of it; and an enemy who has his second line in squadrons, with intervals under his hand as it were, will very easily oblige such a confused mass to abandon their first advantage.

In speaking of the attack, it will appear of what importance it is that a squadron or line should be enabled to rally instantly after a successful charge, which it is almost impossible to do without intervals; one horse is faced one way, another the other, they wish to avoid trampling upon those who are down, that officer must be helped up; this disorder is unavoidable, even in a victorious squadron, after the charge, and must be re-formed as quick as possible. How is that practicable without intervals? the horses length preventing them from turning except by three's or four's, whereas with intervals they can open a little towards the flanks, and in a moment they are re-formed.

If a line of squadrons with intervals meets with an obstacle, or even several of them at the same time, they can easily be avoided and passed, by inclining a little to either flank, or by doubling off from the centre or flanks, without deranging in the least the rest of the line, or being obliged to remain in interline.

If a line en muraille detaches a few files to harrafs an enemy in retreat, how are they to be supported or covered while advancing? if driven in, how are they to re-form into the line? and what confusion do they not cause in doing so? which might all be avoided and rendered easy, by separating the squadrons.

The line en muraille is a true phalanx, and the phalanx has always been, and must remain an unweildy machine, very improper for every operation which requires rapidity; this formation therefore deprives cavalry of its most essential and important advantage, its impulse and impression consisting not less in the rapidity of its action than in its mass and weight.

Puisegur did not recollect that his half squadrons wheeling by the intervals, upon the flanks of the opposite squadrons, would themselves be exposed to be taken in flank by the enemy's second line, which would subject them to be inevitably defeated, and risk involving their whole first line in their retreat; this could not fail to happen from their being attacked in the moment of confusion, produced in that line by the wheeling of so many half squadrons: provided they are attacked with briskness and spirit.

Such large intervals as Puisegur proposes, ought not however to be adopted, his squadrons would be too far from each other; the medium ought to be preferred; from twenty to twenty-five paces, will be sufficient to prevent their being cramped in their movements upon the flanks. It will however frequently happen, that even these will be lost before they arrive at the enemy's line; in a charge, a horse turning a little from the true line of direction, especially if it should be on the

directing flank, will be enough to make the squadron incline too much to the right or left, if they have not a distinct point of view determined.

The effect however of such irregularity will not be very prejudicial, where proper intervals are allowed, nor derange the rest of the line, but may be easily corrected; and even should a whole squadron in such a line be repulsed and broken, it would not involve the rest of them in its misfortune, and a single squadron of the second line or the reserve immediately remedies it; but should this accident happen to the phalanx, it could not be so easily done.

A first line without intervals being beaten, is certain to involve the second in its misfortune, by the confusion unavoidable amongst such a mass in retreat, even should the second line be formed with intervals, they will not wait to examine where they are, especially should the enemy follow up his success with spirit and impetuosity.

Thus by forming a first line *en muraille*, the advantage of a second line is lost, and those troops rendered incapable of any thing but increasing the confusion and defeat.

Small divisions of about 20 light horse, placed opposite to the intervals in interline, would effectually protect the wings of the squadrons of the first line from any attack of the half squadrons of the enemy's charge, in the manner proposed by Puisegur: or the second line might be placed within a hundred yards of the first, which would have the same advantage: for what enemy could be so rash as to present so many flanks of half squadrons to a complete line? or if he should commit so great an error, would he not be quickly punished?

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An idea will be communicated in the following part of these remarks, to combine the impulse of the order en muraille, with that of the line with intervals, without being subject to the inconveniencies of either, as has been already mentioned in the the sixth volume of the military remarks, by the same author.

It should always be recollected, that as the force and effect of cavalry consists in the rapidity of its action, combined with the impetus of its flock, and the order in which it is communicated, every thing that militates against these essential principles, should be carefully guarded against and rejected.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Attack, or Charge.

A Line or wing of cavalry being formed in order, and on the ground from whence it is to move forward to the charge: the officer who has the command of it must be careful that it is parallel to the enemy's line; having neglected this precaution at the battle of Prague, our whole left wing inclined too much to the left, and formed an interval between us and our infantry, into which, by the time we arrived to the enemy, ten squadrons of cavalry might have entered in front.

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The officers commanding squadrons should agree amongst themselves upon certain points of view, upon which to direct their attacks ; it might otherwise happen for two squadrons to charge upon the same point, which would create great confusion ; should, for instance, any rising ground, bushes, &c. intercept the view of the enemy's line, or regiments which are to be charged, some other object observed to be in the direction of them must be chosen, and all the officers ought to be informed that the attack of the squadron is to be directed upon such a height, steeple, bush, tree, &c. but if the enemy can be distinctly seen, they are to be shewn a particular standard, as the 8th, 9th, 10th, &c. from the right or left, upon which they are to direct their charge ; every one must be acquainted with it before they move off their ground, because, if the officer who leads the squadron should be wounded in the time of the charge, the squadron not being properly conducted, for want of the others being acquainted with the point of attack, might cross upon another, whereas when that is known to them all, a squadron will be enabled to continue the attack, notwithstanding such accident ; it is likewise almost impossible for an officer to place himself in front of a squadron, and take the command of it when they have pressed forward with both spurs, but the officers upon the flanks being acquainted with the point of attack, will be able to conduct the charge without quitting them.

It is premised, that the General has taken measures for the protection of the flanks of his cavalry whilst charging ; and if possible, made such a disposition as to enable it to gain those of his enemy, this will be more particularly treated of hereafter.

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It is not always necessary for cavalry to regulate their movements by those of the infantry, it will suffice if they are near enough to attract a part of the fire of the enemy's artillery, and to answer it; to prevent the whole of that fire from being directed upon the cavalry, in the moment that it is advancing to the charge; it should therefore move forward so soon as the cannonade has commenced on both sides, but from that period should not regulate its movements by those of the infantry; whose attack will be very much facilitated by the operations of the cavalry, engaging or defeating that of the enemy; at least attracting their whole attention: should they succeed in obliging the enemy's cavalry to retire, and leave the flank of their infantry uncovered, or, as it is called, in the air; the affair is completed by the attack of the infantry, assisted by a few squadrons of the reserve, falling upon that unprotected wing, as it happened towards the conclusion of the battle of Prague, which decided it in our favour.

It was by manœuvring in this manner that Seydlitz gained the most complete victory at Rosbach; and it is by such decided strokes, that cavalry alone will be frequently enabled to determine the success of a battle; for this purpose, the most prompt and rapid movements are necessary, without balancing or hesitating that the enemy's cavalry may be quickly dispatched, and obliged to abandon the flank of their infantry.

A General officer, on such occasions, should always have several orderly officers, or active intelligent Aids de Camp, well mounted, near him, to carry his orders, and a trumpet to give signals, to which all others should answer, or repeat the same sound; Seydlitz always had several well-mounted Hussars near him, which were very useful.

The wings generally dress by each other, or upon a point of apui, which however is of little use in the operations of cavalry, and totally useless, as soon as the lines have chosen their points of view, and began to move.

At the first sound of the trumpet the whole begin to move forward, first and second line, and the reserve: The attacking wing perfectly dressed in line, marches on at a walk; at the second sound, which ought to be doubled, the whole begin to trot, (which the second line, and the reserve, continue to do till after the charge is finished) at the third sound, which is tripled, at about 150 or 200 paces from the enemy, the first line begins to gallop, and when they approach within 70 or at most 80 yards of the enemy, the trumpets sound gay and lively fanfares or flourishes of the trumpet, then the troopers prick with both spurs, and push forward at full speed, without however entirely slackening the bridle, as all the horses cannot gallop with equal velocity; but when within about twenty paces, they must force their gallop as much as possible, to give the full impulse of the charge, or as the King of Prussia used to call it, the grand coup de collier; the rear ranks must then also press forward with all their weight and speed, as if they would force forward their front ranks or file leaders; this is called furnishing the flock.

The troopers of the front rank raise their swords to the height of their faces, the arm extended in tierce, the point against the eyes of his enemy, and the hand a little turned, that the branch or guard of the sword may cover his own; they must raise themselves a little in the stirrups, the body forward, and aim to place a thrust with the point against the man or the horse opposed to him; in a word, he must do his best,
either



British Cavalry Charge



Four Hanks Charing

either by thrusting or cutting, to disable his enemy; thus the shock or charge is soon finished.

The charge being successful, and the enemy's line broken, the word *halt* must be given, and the appel, or call, founded; the whole in the mean time continue to advance slowly, which will render it much easier to rally, than if the squadron remained upon the spot: but they must dispatch, and no time be lost in examining whether each trooper has exactly fallen into his place; the trumpets then re-commence the fanfares, and the line moves forward again full gallop to pursue the enemy, before they have time to recollect themselves: The second line must then be charged briskly during the consternation and disorder occasioned by the defeat and confusion of the first; this line being obliged then to retreat, the appel, or call, must be again founded, the line re-formed, and no time lost in following up the enemy; without however hurrying so much as to do it in disorder, or pressing forward too much, to prevent putting the horses out of wind; but when there happens to be a *defilé*, through which the retreating enemy is obliged to pass, they must there be pressed with the utmost vigour: it is there that the greatest carnage takes place, which it will be perhaps best to prevent, as the battle is already gained, it will be more humane and honourable to make them prisoners.

Some officers would have a division of each wing of the squadron in the first line detached to pursue the enemy: but at present, when there is with all armies so many Hussars and Light Horse, it is better to leave that to them, for which their horses are properly adapted, they must however be supported by regular close squadrons of cavalry.

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The General seeing it is out of the power of the enemy's cavalry to re-appear, at least for some time, might make a quarter wheel with his cuirassiers and heavy cavalry, and fall upon the infantry in flank and rear; or a part of the two lines might be employed for that purpose. As soon as the enemy's cavalry is pushed beyond their infantry, a part of the squadron of the first line might be detached to fall in column on the flank of their second line of infantry, and other squadrons of the second line to do the same to their first: those squadrons simply wheel to the right or left, according to the wing they are to attack; this manœuvre must be executed with quickness and rapidity, and the whole continue to move forward at the trot, at the same time; during the operation, the first line, if so commanded, will, when at the proper distance, charge the enemy in front, whilst the columns are engaged on their flanks, the second line continues the trot, and preserves its distances of 250 or 300 yards in the rear of the first, and avoid as much as possible trampling upon those of the first line, which may have been dismounted or disabled by the enemy during the charge. This line should be formed with intervals equal to the front of the squadrons; and the reserve should have even larger intervals than those, and would be more properly placed without, or beyond the extremities of the lines, than in the rear of them. The soldiers of the rear ranks should be careful to keep the points of their swords upright that they may not wound their file leaders.

When it is reflected, what bruises a trooper is liable to in his legs, with the present supple boots, from the holsters, knees, carbines, scabbards, &c. of each other, when the squadron charges close and firm as it ought to do, to give it weight and effect. I think it will not be denied, that stiff boots, which will defend the trooper from such accidents,

cidents ought to be given him ; they will at the same time enable him to charge closer in line, than they have ever been able to do since supple boots has been adopted, will give him greater firmness and confidence on horseback ; and allow him to fix his whole attention upon his enemy, instead of being obliged to divide it to parry the wounds he might receive from him in front, and the bruises from the troopers on each side ; strong boot-tops remedy, in a small degree, the evil abovementioned but does not entirely remove it ; both those and the boots should be worn much higher, such as the regiment of Seydlitz has begun to make use of.

It will easily be conceived what terrible blows must be given by two brave troopers who meet each other in the charge ; many people are however of opinion, that the shock of two lines of cavalry never takes place, one always giving way before the other arrives to it ; though this is most frequently the case, it is nevertheless an error to say, that always happens ; at the battle of Gualtala the shock was general : at Strigau likewise, and in which the Saxons lost a number of officers ; at the battle of Sohre, the Prussians the same, and on many other occasions. At Reichenberg, General Purpurati received us with his pistols, and after the discharge, advanced some paces only, sword in hand ; but there was then a real shock given, in which he was defeated.

This is called the regular attack of cavalry, when the order of battle is formed in the usual manner, the cavalry on the wings, and the infantry in the centre, without chicane, or finesse, the importance and effect of cavalry, in this case, depends as much upon the order and precision, as upon the rapidity and courage of the charge ; and most

frequently determines not only its success, but the fate of the day likewise.

It should be fixed in the mind as an invariable and universal axiom, that in whatever situation or position a corps of cavalry might happen to be, it should never wait for the enemy's charge; for in that case its defeat would be certain and unavoidable, all the personal bravery and resolution in the world, would not be able to prevent it: but on the contrary, as soon as it is perceived that coming to blows is unavoidable, they should immediately, without hesitation, move forward to the charge; the decided manner in which this is performed, has the greatest effect upon the confidence and firmness of both, and is the only certain means to prevent being defeated, and most likely to insure that of the enemy.

But since the enormous augmentation of artillery, it is doubtful whether cavalry ought ever to be formed in the order of battle abovementioned, or even in the first line at all; and the wings of infantry are at present in general too well covered, to admit of their being so often attacked in flank by cavalry, as was formerly done; Mons. St. Germain complains, that even in his time the heavy cavalry of France no longer rendered any service, neither on detachments nor in the field.

C H A P. V.

Of Flanks.

THE flanks are the weak parts of an army, or any other body of troops, therefore too many precautions cannot be taken for their security. Infantry have much greater facility in securing their flanks than cavalry, because they are equally proper for the defensive and offensive, and can therefore, when on the defensive, decide the success of an action without moving from their position, if attached in it; which enables them to take every advantage of the nature of the ground, to protect both their front and flanks, by works; a hedge, a ditch, a hollow way, and other innumerable accidental irregularities, or variation in the nature of the ground and country, are so many defences and advantages to them, which would be as many obstacles to the movements of cavalry, who must not (as before said) wait upon their own ground for the attack of their enemy; thus no aid or protection for their flanks, or front, can be of much advantage to them, as they cannot, in the first instance, adapt their formation to such protection, except with great inconvenience and difficulty, and must entirely abandon it, as soon as they move forward to encounter the enemy; as they must always do when attacked. Ditches, intersecting hollow ways, &c. would tend only to embarrass all their movements: and if they should be such as to cover them from the approach of the enemy, to the attack, they will equally prevent their moving forward

to

to meet them, but the enemy's artillery, and infantry, will be enabled to advance against them without danger, and by their fire oblige them to quit their position, without having it in their power to take their revenge.

It is almost impossible that cavalry, who would act agreeable to the principles of that arm, and move forward to the charge of an enemy to be attacked, should be able to preserve an apui capable of covering their flanks for any time ; for it will rarely, if ever happen, that the protecting object, whatever it may be, hollow way, morafs, &c. which might happen to cover them in their position of formation, will extend up to the position on which they must march to the attack ; this was experienced in particular at Prague, where our right was protected by a piece of water, when we formed for the attack, but which was quitted and left in our rear, so soon as we advanced : and the enemy taking the advantage of that circumstance, attacked our advancing wing in flank ; and had it not been for a sudden and unpremeditated manœuvre, our cavalry, which was deranged by it, would not have been enabled to rally again during the remainder of the action, notwithstanding he followed up his advantage, with too much caution and slowness.

Natural obstacles therefore, are not, in all cases, to be depended upon, for the protection of the flanks of cavalry ; and it must be considered what other means can be made use of for that purpose.

When the infantry were encamped in the centre, and cavalry on the wings, the King of Prussia always placed some battalions of grenadiers upon the exterior flanks of the cavalry, fronting outwards to close the line, but which, as soon as the army prepared for

SECURITY OF THE FLANKS.

FIG. 1.

Page 52.




FIG. 2.

Page 53.





FIG. 3.



SECURITY OF FLANKS.

FIG. 1.

Page 54.





FIG. 2.

Page 54.



for action, in an open country, went to the right about, and joined the flank of the infantry; the army thus formed a long square. The advantages of this disposition are, first in checking, and stopping the enemy's cavalry, should yours be repulsed and pursued; which a well supported fire by these battalions, upon the flank of the pursuing enemy, cannot fail to effect, the instant their own have passed along their front, who will be enabled to rally under the protection of this fire, and follow up the enemy in their turn. This happened to the Prussians, at Collin: and to the Austrians, at Leuthen. It is said, that in the first-mentioned battle, this manœuvre was formed suddenly upon the spot: but at Leuthen, the King formed his upon mature deliberation, made previous to the engagement.

The second advantage is, preventing your own cavalry, if defeated, from retreating between the two lines of infantry of the army for protection, which they are very apt to do in great confusion, where the enemy will not fail to follow, and might endanger throwing them into disorder, and cause the defeat of the whole army.

Other dispositions or orders of battle, which might be formed for the protection of the flanks of cavalry, agreeable to the circumstances, or nature of the ground, are,

First. The flank of the first line, being covered by the second, extending a certain distance beyond, or outflanking it, in such manner, that any troops, who would attack the flank of that line, must themselves present a flank to this: and this second line to be in like manner covered by the reserve, outflanking it; the contrary has been the most general practice, without any sufficient reason.

Second. Some squadrons might be placed upon the flanks, in inter-line, at 100 or 150 paces in the rear of each, and to extend beyond the flanks the whole length of their front. These will protect the flanks of their respective lines: and can manœuvre separately, as occasion may require, either by wheeling outwards to front any squadrons of the enemy, which might have made a circuit to fall upon the flanks of the position, or by moving forward to extend the line, as light horse.

Third. A few squadrons of Hussars, may be placed in column, upon each wing, to form an echellon; each squadron to extend beyond the outward flank of the preceding one, about half its front; from this disposition, they are ready to deploy, in an instant, up into line, or by wheeling outwards, until their flanks communicate, and form an oblique line outwards from each flank; or they can, in an instant, form a column to move rapidly forward, and wheel upon the flanks of the enemy, either during the attack, or preparatory to it.

Fourth and last method is, for a corps of light horse to be entirely detached from the line, and posted in the rear, to act as circumstances might render necessary for the protection of the flank, to which his attention is particularly directed; the operations of this corps must be entrusted entirely to the judgment and experience of the officer who commands it, who ought to be a man of quick perception, and rapid execution. He will sometimes find the most effectual manner of protecting the flank of his own lines, will be by attacking those of the enemy; should the wing to which he belongs, make a successful charge, he will directly pass before it in pursuit of the defeated enemy.

By

By those, and other dispositions, which will frequently occur to an officer of experience, in the course of service, cavalry might be so placed as to protect and cover their own flanks, and render it impracticable for an enemy, without great risk, to attack them, even with a great superiority, and in a country devoid of all chicane.

A relation of the occurrences that took place at the battle of Prague, in which the author bore a part, will illustrate the above reflections, and evince the utility of such dispositions.

The left wing of our cavalry was applied upon a large piece of water, which for the time secured that flank, and made it a good defensive position for infantry. General Haddick, who commanded the wing opposed to us, formed his Hussars en potence, extending beyond the piece of water, which did not reach above an hundred yards in our front, in such manner, that in advancing we must march directly into this potence, and expose our flank to those Hussars, to counteract these, five squadrons were placed in column, in interline upon that flank: but this was badly judged, since in quitting the water they could not deploy or form, but by giving their flanks in succession to the Hussars of Haddick; it was however necessary to move forward, the lines being in motion for that purpose: The author was posted in the rear of the left of the infantry, with five squadrons of Hussars, to act as circumstances might require, who, before the attack commenced, rode with General Norman, to the front, to observe the dispositions that were making, and the position of the enemy; the error above alluded to, was quickly perceived, and the author proposed to General Norman, who commanded the second line, to order some squadrons of dragoons to wheel to the right, and march round the piece of water, to attack, in flank, this potence of Hussars
fo

so regularly formed to enclose and surround our left, as soon as it should move 100 paces forward; that General hesitated, and did not think he was authorised to make such a movement of his own authority, or from some other reason. On rejoining the five squadrons, and after having explained, in a few words, to the officers of it, the reasons for making that movement, the author commanded to the left by files, and on the march to extend the front, reduced the three ranks into two, and likewise formed large intervals between the squadrons. The water was now on our right; General Haddick observed this manœuvre, and as he had abundance of Hussars, he detached eight squadrons to counteract it, without in the least deranging his potency. These two hostile corps having passed the pond, approached each other in parallel lines, very close together, and each redoubled their pace to gain the flank of the other; our squadrons aimed at their right, and they at our left. In the mean time our cavalry in line charged, and were at first so far successful as to overset almost all the enemy's first line; they were however afterwards in their turn repulsed and obliged to retreat, which was very much to be attributed to the attack of those Hussars en potency upon the flank. Haddick's Hussars having our squadrons on their left, made a discharge with their carbines, without halting; however, no person was touched by it, though we were not 100 paces distant; our squadrons, having got faster over the ground than they did, outflanked them, at length by half a squadron; fronted, charged, and dispersed them, and two squadrons were detached in their pursuit. The pond, which by this time we had nearly marched round, was still on our right, the three remaining squadrons were wheeled to the right, and by that manœuvre hemmed in several troops of Haddick's Hussars, which had passed through the large intervals, and who instantly surrendered, and with them we re-took several of ours they had taken. Our squadrons then
formed,

FIG. 1.

Page 56.






FIG. 2.





formed, completed the tour of the water, and marched upon the right flank of the Austrian cavalry, which followed ours too leisurely, though not in much order. At the appearance of those squadrons upon their flank, they immediately halted; these were the horse grenadiers of Purpurati, who on this demonstration against their flank, by no more, at this time, than 200 Hussars; (the surplus being occupied in taking prisoners, collecting horses, &c.) advanced not a step farther.

The King of Prussia approved of this manœuvre, and just before the battle of Colin, the author being on his return with 700 horse, from a patrol, which he had been making up to the mouth of the Sastova, in Moldau, was met by the King, who said, that as he had so much contributed to the security of the flank of the army, at the battle of Prague, he would expect the same service from him here; for which purpose he should retain the command of the detachment, at present with him, and act on the left as he might see occasion. Though this was certainly an honourable testimony of the author's service, yet he hopes the relation of it will not be attributed to vanity: but as an instance of the utility of detached corps, to act as occasion might require; having a pointed and determined object, such as that, in the present case, for the protection of the flanks.

C H A P. VI.

Of the March, and the Deploy.

EVERY corps of cavalry, of whatever magnitude, or at any time in peace, as well as war; and in all situations, as well at home as abroad, should on all occasions, have on a march, an advance, and an arrear guard; and always where practicable small patrols, or flankers, upon equal front with them, detached to the right and left, more or less, according to the nature of the ground; they must ascend the heights near them, that they may be enabled to discover the surrounding country, examine the roads, villages, open country, woods, &c. and instantly report every thing extraordinary which they may observe, such as troops in motion, signals, &c. However unnecessary this might appear, when there is no apprehensions of an enemy, yet it is a very important instruction, both to officers and soldiers, and habituates them to vigilance; and troops who have been accustomed to take these precautions in time of peace, it will certainly be very difficult to surprise, in the operations of actual service in the neighbourhood of an enemy.

Several military authors have employed their pens in the detail of measures to be taken for the security of the march of troops, which is indeed an important object, as well for night marches, as those by day; Birac, in particular, has treated on the former.

An

An army on its march towards the enemy, either to take an advantageous position nearer to that occupied by him, or with the intent of attacking him in it, must always be preceded by a strong advanced guard, composed of infantry, and cavalry; at present the corps of reserve is generally selected for that service, because they are composed of grenadiers, and other chosen and resolute troops, prepared for every enterprize. This advance guard should move forward, before the army, and occupy such positions, passes, or defilés, as might happen to be on or near the line of march of the columns of the army, and post themselves in such a manner, as to be enabled to maintain such positions against all the attacks of the enemy, until the arrival of their own army.

Let us suppose the operations of the army to lay in a plain and open country; and that it is to march forward by the right, in eight columns, each line forming four; those of the second line following the rear of the first. On approaching the position or emplacement, where they are to reform the order of battle; the heads of the columns of the second line, disengage themselves to the right of the rear divisions of the first, and move forward, until the cavalry arrive at the sixth squadron from the front, upon which they continue to regulate their march, until the squadrons close forward to deploy. See the plan.



The

The propriety and correctness of this manœuvre, a little investigation will make evident: for if the columns of the second line were to remain attached to the rear of those of the first, until the signal was given for the army to deploy into line; should those columns be strong, they would have a considerable distance to march in column after the first had deployed, before they would arrive upon the ground on which they were to form; as they could not begin to move until the column of that line had quitted their ground: or should they begin to deploy at the same time with the first, the second line would be formed at too great a distance from the other, and must either march forward in line, or break into columns for that purpose, both of which are subject to much confusion and loss of time, besides other considerable inconveniences which must, if possible, be always avoided in presence of an enemy.

But by the heads of the columns of the second line, disengaging to the right, or left, according to the wing by which the army marched off their ground; and to that which they are consequently to deploy, and moving up to the battalion or squadron, that corresponds to the distance between the two lines which we here supposed to be the sixth; upon the signal to deploy being given, the whole army, first and second, lines, (and the reserve, by the same means) begin to deploy in the same time, and all immediately form up to their proper places, and distances; the squadrons of the second line opposite to the intervals of those of the first.

A column of troops of any number of squadrons, by whatever flank they may have been broken into column might deploy on the right, left, or centre, or any intermediate squadrons; this may be better explained

plained by small pieces of cards numbered to represent the squadrons ; in whatever manner the squadrons are to deploy, they ought always to march upon a given point of support, or appui.

Whenever an army is to make a movement or manœuvre in columns, the heads of them ought to regulate their march by each other, both as to line and distance, as much as the nature of the ground will permit, so that on an alarm, in the shortest time possible the whole may deploy into line, in their natural positions, without hurry or confusion : The heads of the columns should march with the ordinary step, that the succeeding divisions might be enabled to preserve their distances without hurrying, which most frequently happens from the negligence of the officers ; a single person stopping a moment in front of a troop to light his pipe, or any other reason, is sufficient to derange the order of the march of the whole column ; they move on briskly to regain their distance, which every succeeding division is obliged to do, in an increased proportion. The strictest attention should be paid to that circumstance.

When a *defilé*, or other obstacle, is to be passed, the leading divisions should move very slow, until the rear of the column has passed it, and then the ordinary pace insensibly resumed.

A column of cavalry, on its march towards the enemy, before they arrive within the range of cannon shot, should make the divisions, or quarter squadrons close up forward ; the officers, and non-commissioned officers, who are not posted in the ranks, move to the flanks, that nothing might prevent the division from closing well upon the leading one ; care must be taken to avoid confusion : and that the

squadrons, and battalions, do not intermix, but remain at ten paces from each other : The word, *form squadron*, is then given, which is to be performed in the manner described in the books of exercise, and is in general every where similar; this must be done with quickness and precision: the rear divisions, upon the oblique, at a gallop; the whole continue the march at the ordinary pace, and close the squadrons forward, within 12 paces of each other; (in this manner 30 squadrons does not appear at a distance to be more than ten, marching with their open distances; advantage of which may frequently be taken to deceive an enemy, as to the strength of a column, especially when the standards are lowered for that purpose) but here it is meant to facilitate the rapidity and correctness of the deploying into line, and to prevent the horses of the rear squadrons from having too far to gallop, from thence to the opposite extremity of the line or wing to which they belong, and frequently over intersecting valleys, ditches, &c. whereas this close formation brings them nearly upon the ground of their position, and prevents their being galloped out of wind to get into line before the action commences.

By the means above described, a Prussian army of any magnitude, must be formed in order of battle, in eight minutes, commencing from the instant that the signal is given to deploy, provided the number of columns are proportioned to the strength of the army.

At Leuthen, the King of Prussia did not make the army deploy, although it advanced in several columns. When the heads of the columns of the army had arrived within sight of the right wing of Prince Charles of Lorain's army, where they made their appearance, on purpose to deceive him, as to the point of attack, and which caused General

Luthezy

Oblique line.

L



First Manoeuvre

Luchezy, who commanded that wing to demand the reserve ; all the heads of the columns wheeled at once to the right obliquely, and marched forward until they joined the rear of the right hand column, which was their natural order of battle, having marched by the right ; thus, in an instant, the whole army, without quitting the ordinary step, where formed, by a quarter wheel to the left, by divisions, into an oblique line, upon the enemy's left wing, before they had time to make any movement to interrupt, or disposition to counteract that manœuvre.

Another order of march towards the enemy is, by the flank, in order of battle ; the whole army, first and second line, and reserve, wheeling to the right or left, by divisions, each forming a separate column ; and when arrived upon the ground, upon which they are to re-form, they have nothing to do but to wheel opposite flanks into line : or upon the same backwards, which will be more correct, as the pivots will all be preserved, and cover.

This was the order of march of the King of Prussia's army, at the battle of Prague, and at Collin, having marched by the left, and in several other battles likewise.

Reichenberg was the only battle in which the Prussians formed by deploying, and there without any very good reason ; the author has made several observations upon that battle in another work. The whole of the forming and manœuvring performed in that action, was different from what is usually practised ; the cavalry was formed and engaged in the centre, and the infantry on the right. At Torgou,
the

the corps commanded by the King marched off by the left : and that of Zeithen, by the right.

This manner of marching by lines, is the only one which ought to be made use of on marching parallel to the enemy, because the line is formed to its proper front, in an instant, if the enemy should make any demonstrations of attacking it upon its march.

To mention something further relative to the deployment, suppose five squadrons to have formed column by the right, on their march, are commanded to deploy ; at the word of command, the fifth or last squadron continues to march forward, the others march obliquely to the right, by traversing ; but if the columns should be stronger, then the leading divisions should wheel to the right, and march upon the point of appui, until they arrive at their position in the line, and then front into it.

The commanding officers of the squadrons which deploy to the right, look to the left, though the rest of the squadron keep their eyes to the right because they must dress upon the fifth squadron, which is thus performed : so soon as the fourth squadron, by traversing to the right, has cleared the front of the fifth, and has taken its interval of 20 or 25 paces, the officer commands, *halt ; eyes to the left ; dress ;* the third squadron performs the same by the fourth ; and thus in succession, until the whole are formed, and dressed by the fifth squadron. The commanding officer of the regiment then gives the word, *eyes to the right ;* and *dress ;* they are then to regulate their movements by the right hand squadron ; which becomes the squadron of direction.

To



Second Manœuvre

To deploy to the left, which is more easy than to the right, the leading or right hand squadron moves slowly forward, their eyes to the right, other squadrons, eyes to the left, except the commanding officers; the second squadron traverses to the left, and forms line with the first, which the commanding officer observing, commands, *eyes to the right; dress*; these continue to move forward, and the third traverses into line the same, and thus in succession, until the whole are formed; or having formed column by the right, they are to deploy upon the centre. Then the third squadron must continue to move forward: the two first squadrons must traverse to the right, and the rear ones to the left, as in the two preceding examples. The centre squadron being in this manœuvre, that of direction, the two first dress eyes to the left, and the two rear squadrons to the right; and vice versa should the column have marched by the left.

By being attentive that the Colonel's right hand squadron always forms to the right of the line, no mistake or confusion can ever happen, provided a proper degree of attention is paid, by both officers and troopers, to the aids above described.

C H A P. VII.

Of gaining the Flank of an Enemy.

AFTER having provided for the safety of the flanks of his own army, the principal attention of a General, in the time of action, ought to be how to succeed in gaining those of his enemy ; this is a very important operation, or rather decisive, but very difficult to perform, and only to be attempted by troops who have been accustomed to manœuvre with great order and precision, as well as rapidity and spirit, and must be so suddenly performed, as not to allow the enemy time to form his counter dispositions, to interrupt them, or even to discover the intention, but in the moment of its execution.

The most simple manner of gaining an enemy's flank, is by extending the front, until it exceeds the length of that occupied by them, which is called outflanking : but few officers will be so simple as not to observe it, and must be very weak indeed, not to devise means to punish those who adopt it. A second and much preferable method is, at the moment the line moves forward to the attack, the two flank squadrons detach themselves from it, and wheel the half circle by divisions, and march with rapidity upon the flank of the enemy's lines.

The

The King of Prussia performed this manœuvre, by making the leading squadron move forward to the enemy's second line, and to attack that in flank at the same time that the others fell upon that of the first, or at least to make such demonstration, as to prevent that line from moving forward to extricate the flank of the other : by this manœuvre, the squadron, which has gained the flank of the first line, is protected by the leading squadron, from being attacked itself in flank, by that of the second; and if the enemy has not made his previous dispositions to counteract such attack, his defeat will be certain, before the reserve can be brought up to remedy it; such operations as those are generally finished in a few minutes, being followed up by the charge of the whole wing in almost the same instant.

Two other squadrons might be concealed in the rear of the line, to supply the place of those who quit it to fall upon the enemy's flank, the moment they move forward for that purpose, this would prevent that wing from being weakened by their absence: but great care must be taken that nothing which might tend to an indication of such preparation may be discovered by the enemy, as that would defeat its effect.

This manœuvre is subject to caution, and can only be performed with light active cavalry accustomed to move with rapidity, order, and precision, commanded by brave, intelligent, and decided officers.

A third method of gaining an enemy's flank, is by forming a column of light cavalry upon the extremity of each wing in interline, as if intended for the security of that flank; each of those columns may be composed of a regiment of cavalry, and are to move forward in column
by

by divisions, at full gallop, and when arrived at the height of the enemy's flank, the divisions wheel to the right or left, into line, without halting, and charge in the same time that the line moves forward to the attack in front. If a regiment should thus succeed in gaining an enemy's flank, the operation is soon finished : for one squadron, in such a moment, charging as abovementioned, is sufficient to decide the success of the attack of a whole wing, and even the fate of a battle.

Or two or three squadrons of the head of the column might deploy to mask the manœuvre, and cover the flanks of the rest of the column, on its movement, to the enemy's flank, as might be thought most expedient according to the nature of the ground, troops, and other circumstances.

Cavalry ought for this purpose to be frequently exercised to trot and gallop in column, without losing their distances ; that at the word, *halt*, *front*, or *wheel into line* ; the whole may be at once formed, and ready to charge forward.

A column should frequently practice moving upon irregular and curve lines, zig zags, and angles, which is difficult to perform in order, but frequently necessary in the field ; and above all, at the word *trot*, or *gallop*, should break immediately into that pace, and continue in it with a regular and uniform movement, until another word of command is given ; this in a great measure depends upon the attention of the officers. With a wing or corps of cavalry, accustomed to such precision in all their movements, the most daring and hazardous enterprizes might be attempted with success, as they are at all times
ready

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.




Fig. 3.







Fig. 4.



ready for action, and find it equally practicable to attack an enemy at a critical moment of weakness or disorder, or avoid him when superior.

It was with such troops as those above alluded to, that Seydlitz decided the success of the battle of Roßbach, taking the advantage of the ground, by making the circuit of a rideau which was favourable for it, he masked the movement which he made with the dragoons to fall upon the enemy's flank ; who did not perceive them until the moment they were attacked.

Sometimes an enemy's flank is gained by a corps of light cavalry, concealed at hand, to fall upon it at the moment that the line moves forward to the charge ; the Austrian Hussars had this advantage at the battle of Sohr, but lost it by pillaging the baggage. They were supposed to be then under the command of Werner, afterwards a Lieutenant General in the Prussian service.

When an army abounds in light cavalry, a part of them might be very usefully employed in making a circuit during the action, to form a demonstration of attack, in the rear of the enemy's line, and on their flank ; being careful to make their tour so wide, as not to fall in with any enemy's posts, or parties, to avoid discovery.

The appearance of such troops in the enemy's rear, during the engagement, cannot fail to have a very important effect, and will not subject such detachment to any very great risk, even if they should not succeed : for light cavalry, commanded by an enterprising officer, if they should be intercepted on one side, will always be enabled to retire

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by

by the other, or extricate themselves in a hundred different manners. A good light cavalry, well conducted, can never be cut off, nor fail of accomplishing their retreat. This manœuvre was frequently performed by the troops of the King of Prussia.



C H A P. VIII.

Distribution of Cavalry, in the Line, and Corps de Reserve; and the Disposition of that Arm opposed to Infantry.

IT would much conduce to the strength of a position, if all the infantry of an army were encamped in the first and second lines, and the cavalry in the rear of them; they are certainly very improper for the flanks of a permanent or defensive position, and are utterly defenceless in night attacks or surprises, and require both artillery and infantry to protect them. It is surprising that opportunities have not more frequently been taken to punish those who encamp in this defective, though usual manner.

Infantry, by the nature of its arms and institution is enabled to defend itself in every situation, and on all natures of ground, which cavalry cannot do, and therefore should not be exposed to be attacked upon its own ground; but being secured from surprise or sudden attack
by

by the infantry in its front; by the rapidity of its movement, is enabled instantly to render itself at its post on the wings, or wherever it might happen to be assigned, before an enemy can have made any progress, and will find the ground on which it is to act unincumbered by tents, forage, or any other impediment; many other advantages accruing from this disposition will immediately strike an experienced officer, and which it will therefore be needless here to enumerate.

The advanced guards of the cavalry should, notwithstanding, extend along the front of the position, and on its flanks, and rear; and the cavalry should have their posts correctly assigned them, upon which they might move in the shortest time possible, after an alarm or signal has been given for that purpose.

Count St. Germain, in his manœuvres, is of the same opinion with regard to the encamping of cavalry, as every officer must be, who reflects seriously upon the nature of that arm. A camp ought to resemble a fortress, and cavalry is acknowledged not to be proper for the defensive.

Cavalry has frequently been encamped in the manner above recommended, but upon broken and intersected ground only, which would not admit of its being in the first line; for instance, in the position on which the army were encamped, before the battle of Rosback, in consequence of a ravine extending along the front of the army: so soon as the troops moved forward to the attack, the cavalry filed off to the left, and formed two lines; the regiments which belonged to the right wing, forming the second; by which disposition all the cavalry of the army, except the grand guards, were formed on the left of the infantry.

Before

Before the battle of Loboschitz, the Prussian cavalry was formed in the front of the centre of the infantry, but that was because a thick fog prevented that army from discovering the movements of that of the enemy commanded by General Brown, which were thought to be retrograde, and it was therefore imagined that this would be nothing but an attack of the rear guard.

At Zornsdorf all the cavalry were placed in the rear of the infantry, and did not come into action until after their defeat; Seydlitz, who had never hitherto particularly distinguished himself, did not think that the cavalry which was under his command, ought to retire at so cheap a rate, and succeeded so well in the manœuvres which he performed with it, as to restore the success of the action, at a time when it was conceived to be irretrievable, and nothing thought of but how to secure the best retreat.

Every General commanding an army, at the commencement of a campaign, forms a plan or arrangement of the disposition of the troops under his command, distributing them into brigades, wings, first and second lines, reserves, corps of observation, communication, &c. and this disposition is called the order of battle; but it is not to be imagined that it is literally adhered to on all occasions in presence of an enemy; the real intention of it is to determine the rank and situation of the General officers to the command of infantry, cavalry, centre and wings of the army of the first and second lines, reserve, &c. as well as of regiments, brigades, divisions, &c. all of which must be accurately settled, and clearly understood, before the army begins to move, to prevent confusion and dissatisfaction amongst the troops and officers.

This

This order of battle, is that in which the army would encamp in a plain and open country, for the purpose of a review, or when under no apprehensions of an enemy: but by no means binding to the General commanding the army, to abide by on all occasions, as such dispositions must be combined by him as corresponds to the nature of the ground, situation of the enemy, and the kind of service to be performed by the army; whether upon the offensive or defensive: and various other reasons, which depend entirely upon the judgment and decision of the General, agreeable to the object of the campaign.

Every detached corps, of any considerable strength, should always have its order of battle; of which each officer of the staff ought to have a copy.

The corps de reserve is at present frequently composed in the same manner as a piquet: but we will here suppose it such as it ought to be, composed of infantry, and cavalry, appointed to perform that particular service, and under the command of such officers as are best acquainted with the nature and importance of it. Sometimes the corps de reserve is composed according to the nature of the ground, of cavalry only. Light cavalry is the most proper to be employed on this service, by reason of the advantage they possess of being enabled to render themselves, with promptness and expedition, to any part of the line, which might be particularly pressed upon by the enemy, and begin to give way; every thing depends upon their arriving with alacrity in this critical moment; it is certain, much more depends upon that circumstance, than even the effect of their attack when arrived, and therefore those Generals who have placed cuirassiers in their corps de reserve, had not good reason for so doing.

The most advantageous disposition with regard to the reserve, is to divide it into three distinct corps, one to be placed in the rear of each wing of infantry, and the third in the rear of the centre of the second line: but the King of Prussia, from scarcity of troops to oppose the numerous armies he had to engage, was frequently obliged to have only the latter, and even that to consist of Hussars only, to which a battalion frank or two were sometimes added.

A corps de reserve is of such importance, that no army, corps, or detachment of troops, however small, should be without one proportioned to their strength; the advantage of having troops at hand, to correct any error or defect in the lines of an army, at the moment of attack, is evidently very important; for instance: Suppose the line to have moved forward upon false points, and consequently to break in many places, this defect would continually increase, and risk the defeat of the army, were it not for the reserve; a few battalions, or squadrons of which, marching into that interval, immediately remedies it.

It is likewise necessary to have troops in reserve, to support any part of the line, against which the principal efforts of the enemy might happen to be directed; or to relieve any regiment whose ranks might have been so much thinned during the action, as to weaken the line in that part. Also to check the progress of an enemy, who may have penetrated the line before he has time to take the full advantage of his success; and nothing tends more to restore the exertions and confidence of troops, who might happen to be particularly pressed upon by the enemy, than the arrival of fresh troops from the reserve, to their support: and consequently, nothing tends more to abate the ardour of the enemy. And lastly, the utility of the reserve is very great, to secure the retreat of the army, when after every effort, the fate of the day has been unfavourable.


favourable. Instances of the advantages of each of those applications of the reserve have been too frequent, in all times and services, to render it necessary to particularize any of them to a military reader.

The reserve likewise serves to accelerate the defeat of an enemy, by advancing rapidly upon their infantry so soon as it appears to be ready to give way; this the regiment of Bayreuth performed at Strigau; or to charge the troops who cover the retreat of a defeated enemy, when the infantry cannot come up with them; which distinction must be understood; for the difference is very great, between an attack by cavalry against infantry, fresh, and in good order, formed, and prepared to receive it: and that of falling upon those who are covering a retreat, after their army has been defeated. It is however sometimes absolutely necessary for cavalry to attack infantry perfectly in order, and prepared for their reception; the following is a disposition for that purpose, which the author himself has practised, on more than one occasion, with success.

Suppose a corps of reserve to be composed of fifteen squadrons, five of which are dragoons, and the remainder Hussars: The whole must pass through the lines of their infantry at the same time, intervals being formed for that purpose, by doubling the ranks. The first five squadrons form column, the ten others form line, upon the right and left of the rear squadron of the column of dragoons: the column should close up without however mixing or confounding the squadrons; the whole must move forward together; the dragoons, with the greatest vivacity, throw themselves upon the enemy's infantry, sword in hand, at the same time making loud huzzas, and screams: The remaining ten
squadrons

squadrons advance with less rapidity, and in good order, having little more to do, until the column has penetrated, than to protect it against any attack of the enemy's cavalry, and to prevent the infantry from forming flanks against them.

The column must observe, first to remain well closed, rather in mass than open, to increase the weight of their charge, and to form a less object for the enemy's fire, of which the ten others, however attract also their proportion. Secondly, they should always give loud huzzas, or screams, in the attack of infantry, to alarm and confound them, as well as to prevent their own horses and men from hearing the whistling of the balls, the sound of which, on such an occasion, intimidates more than the effect of them; this is the reason why that difference is to be made between the attack of infantry and cavalry, which latter must be charged with the greatest order, and as much silence as possible, that all the words of command, and signals of the trumpet, may be distinctly heard: without that, all would soon be confusion; but the case is totally different in the attack of infantry; in charging of which, it is allowed by all officers of cavalry, to be very essential for the troopers to emit loud screams or huzzas. The author of these remarks, without this, perhaps would not have succeeded as he did near Schandau, in 1756, in totally destroying the Austrian grenadiers, under the command of Loudon, at that time Lieutenant Colonel; notwithstanding the obstinate defence they bravely made; and this was performed with only 450 Hussars. The manœuvres, and courageous resistance made by those brave croat grenadiers, were such as to merit the greatest praise, and inspire respect for that nation; though under such a commanding officer, they could hardly do other than acquire reputation.



The column of dragoons must advance in as close order as possible; the officers, and non-commissioned officers on the flanks, and those who close the rear of the column, must prevent the troopers from quitting it, either on the flanks or rear, and should not even omit to do so with the sword or pistol, if other means in this trying moment should not be sufficient; simple words will be of no avail with some foldiers, and no time must now be lost in altercation.

The three first squadrons having pierced and passed through the enemy's first line, move forward and deploy in front of the second line, or the reserve; the fourth wheels to the right, and the fifth to the left, to roll up the infantry, by the flanks which the first has opened. The ten squadrons of Hussars which follow, will prevent the enemy from making any movement to interrupt this operation; with a well disciplined, active, and resolute corps of cavalry, this is much sooner performed than described: and completed before the enemy will have time to bring up his reserve to counteract it. A first line of infantry being thus, or by any other means broken, and dispersed, the second is usually defeated without much difficulty: because they cannot make use of their fire arms without killing the dispersed foldiers of their own first line: not to mention the confusion and dismay, which must naturally prevail under such circumstances. Of the ten squadrons of Hussars, seven should then pass through, and form in line with the three squadrons of dragoons, to oppose the enemy's second line or reserve: but if there should be no apprehensions of that line, or the enemy's cavalry, either from their being at too great a distance, or any other reason, then the whole fifteen squadrons might act against the infantry; it was nearly in this manner that Seydlitz manœuvred at Zornsdorf; Marshal Gessler,

at Strigau; and General Leideritz, at Keffelsdorf; where no cavalry appeared to disengage their infantry who were thus roughly handled.

This manœuvre, however, is subject to very great caution, provided the enemy's cavalry should be at hand, to fall upon the dragoons whilst sabring the infantry, unless they should be such as might be safely despised. In a regular action so soon as the enemy's infantry are perceived to lose ground, or ballancing between resistance and retreat, the cavalry of the reserve should instantly pass through the first line of infantry; and the first squadron that is formed, should charge forward with all the vigour possible, without waiting for the others, who ought also to make all possible dispatch to follow and support them, for every moment is precious on such an occasion.

It is then that the greatest havoc is made amongst the enemy's infantry; the soldiers throwing themselves upon the ground pretending to be dead, to escape being sabred; and it frequently happens that they will suffer themselves to be stripped and plundered, and left naked in the depth of winter, in the open field, without giving the least signs of life, an instance of which particularly occurred at Catholic Hennerdorf, in Saxony, in 1745.

From the above remarks, it is apparent that the most essential of the operations of cavalry consists in the vivacity and precision of its movements, and these are advantages which the Prussians possess in a superior degree, because they are continually practised to it, both in camps of instruction, in time of peace, and in the more important operations of war, in actual service.

The

The march in line ought always to be preferred when practicable in the presence of an enemy ; any number of squadrons can then change their point of attack, or manœuvre with the same facility as a single regiment, and keep an enemy who depends upon the goodness of his position, and has not the same confidence in the precision of his own manœuvres, in the greatest suspense and uncertainty, until the moment that the troops suddenly move forward to the charge, upon the most favourable point for them, and where perhaps least expected by the enemy.

The cavalry of the corps de reserve ought to be posted as near the second line as possible, or some squadrons in the intervals, this will enable them to arrive in time to support the infantry of the first line, on any point required, or in which the enemy's cavalry might have made an impression.

Or if the cavalry of the reserve should be required to advance upon the enemy's infantry, in a critical moment of confusion, or hesitation, this corps, by such disposition, will be at hand instantly to perform that service, and seize, with rapidity, that decisive advantage the instant it offers. It ought however to be observed, that the abovementioned nature of troops should not be posted in such situations as to be unnecessarily exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery.

The infantry of the reserve is rarely of any considerable service in an open and plain country, because it cannot move with sufficient expedition, to any point upon which the greatest efforts of the enemy might be directed, or to oppose their progress where they may have been so successful as to penetrate.

The

The only service which can be expected from them in such situations, is to cover the retreat in case it becomes necessary ; and even that is not always to be depended upon : for if the enemy's cavalry should follow close upon the rear of those who retire in disorder, it cannot always avoid being hurried away with them. It would be almost impossible for the infantry of the reserve to make any effectual opposition in such confusion, where they even to wait for the victorious enemy, because it would be impossible to make use of their fire in such a multitude, or even to distinguish the enemy, until they were within reach of their sabres ; it is therefore a very bad crisis, when at the close of an action it is necessary to have recourse to the battalions of the reserve to cover the retreat.

It should be remarked, that when the wing of an enemy's cavalry has been routed, they ought, by proper manœuvres, to be always thrown upon the lines of their own infantry ; it was a similar manœuvre which caused that complete and total deroute at Rosback.

C H A P. IX.

Of the Movements of Cavalry, in oblique Line.

THE attack in oblique line, or as it was formerly called, in echarpe, is the most formidable of all the orders of attack, and ought never to be omitted, when practicable, as it is the most difficult of all others for an enemy to resist, or evade.

An officer who perceives the enemy forming an oblique line, with an intent of attacking him in his position, cannot make use of a more effectual manœuvre to counteract it, than by instantly moving forward to attack him, before he has completed his disposition; this manœuvre, by reducing him from, the offensive to the defensive, must totally derange his plan of operations, will oblige him suddenly to form a new order of attack, totally different from his original intention, which cannot fail of being defective, as it is the effect of precipitation, and almost surprise. Such decided movements as that above proposed, by deranging the preconcerted plans of an enemy's attack, in the moment of their execution, are capable of producing very great and advantageous effects.

If the Austrians had followed this system at Leuthen, as they might have done, by advancing upon the heads of the Prussian columns, so

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
soon

soon as they made their appearance, that day would have been concluded with a success totally different.

It is therefore very important to conceal, as much as possible, the dispositions preparatory to an attack, in oblique line, from the enemy a corps of light cavalry should be thrown forward, to prevent him from reconnoitring the previous movements, and to mask, by every means in their power, the disposition of the line, until it is ready to move forward to the attack; or feigned demonstrations might be made, in various directions, to deceive and confound the enemy, and prevent his having any distinct conception of the real attack, until it is too late to avoid, or counteract it.

The usual manner of performing this manœuvre, is for the divisions to move forward upon the given alignment: and then, by wheeling up, they are at once formed in oblique line upon the enemy's flank, as has been mentioned in the description of the battle of Leuthen.

Or an oblique line might be formed by the following movements: After the enemy's Hussars have been driven in from their advanced posts upon their lines, to prevent their reconnoitring the disposition, a point of view must be given to the officer upon the flank, to which the oblique is to be formed, upon which the flank file of his troop must direct the head of his horse: the other troopers must close up to that flank, and lay the heads of their horses against the knee of the trooper, on the flank towards which they are to oblique: this is called head to boot; by this means, a regiment of five squadrons, moving 500 paces forward, might gain 100 paces to the right or left, and the opposite flank will be 50 paces retired: and the line will be formed in
perfect



perfect oblique, by only turning the horses head a little towards the opposite hand.

This is a very safe manœuvre to perform in the presence of an enemy, as the line is instantly formed, either by moving straight forward, or by inclining the horses head to the opposite flank; and it ought always to be made use of to deploy into line. Marching into the alignment by divisions, in the presence of an enemy, is subject to great caution, as the divisions upon the wheel to form line, present so many flanks, which an active light cavalry would not fail taking the advantage of. Another advantage of forming the oblique upon an enemy's flank, by the above movement, is the difficulty of its being discerned by the enemy: for it is not easy to distinguish at a distance, whether cavalry formed in line is correctly parallel, or whether it inclines gradually to one flank or the other, or even if it is in motion, until the standards are perceived in the position for the charge, and the squadrons formed to their proper front; whereas if the squadrons were to break into divisions, the intention of that movement could not be an instant concealed from them.

This method of performing the oblique manœuvre renders it very easy and correct, and is very important to be particularly recollected.

By this movement also a wing of an army might change its position, and march upon any new point of appui, without deranging its proper front: but then the retired flank must move up and dress with that they have been marching upon; this is done successively by files, which is at the same time correct and expeditious.

Another

Another species of oblique, made use of by the Prussians, is to reinforce that wing of the army which is opposed to the weakest of the enemy's, to make the whole effort with that reinforced wing, and to regulate the obliquity of the rest of the line, by its progress; the wing which is not reinforced must be kept retired, and refuse the action, the rest of the line successively engages, as the reinforced wing advances. This manœuvre was performed at Leuthen, with the greatest precision and success, and several officers present could not comprehend how it happened, that although at the beginning of the action we were upon the left flank of the Austrian army; and with a small front, we should nevertheless outflank their right at the close of the action.

Puisegur, in his remarks upon the battle of Nordlingen, treats perfectly of the oblique, (this is his master piece) and it was agreeable to his principles that the King of Prussia manœuvred, at the battle of Colin, where, if it had not been for the mistakes of Prince M——, of D——, and of General M——, we should have had all the success which the excellent dispositions of the King so much merited, since the principal difficulties were already conquered, by carrying the heights, upon which the Austrian's right was formed, and that almost without loss.

C H A P. X.

Of Cavalry, and Infantry, combined in Corps,

IT has already been observed, that the incorporated combination of cavalry, and infantry, was very proper, and even necessary, against the Turks, because their infantry, not being regularly formed, nor having any bayonets, and re-charging their fire-arms very slowly, cavalry has nothing to apprehend from them, (and might advance with their pipes in their mouths) but notwithstanding, any thing which might be asserted to the contrary, such mixed dispositions against regular troops, formed upon principles of European tactics, would be extremely defective, and the defeat of those troops, by whom it is adopted, must be the inevitable consequence: for in a line of troops thus composed, the cavalry would be obliged to march with the same pace as the infantry, and to halt when they did; this alone is sufficient to deprive them of their greatest advantage, which is, rapidity. Let it be likewise considered, by advancing thus slowly against a line of infantry, what repeated discharges they must receive, without being in any manner enabled to take their revenge; the enemy's infantry and artillery, which happens to be opposed to them, will be perfectly at their ease, and enabled deliberately to take their aim, and re-load, without inter-

Z

ruption;

ruption ; and the destruction of the cavalry would be certain, before it arrived within 200 paces of the enemy's line.

Should the cavalry determine to charge forwards, sword in hand, the manœuvre which is proper for them, they must renounce the protection which it is pretended they receive from their infantry, and would not be formed in proper order for the charge of regular infantry, in an advantageous position, and which has not been in the least deranged by any attack: and should they be repulsed, the troopers are in too much haste to get from under the enemy's fire, to examine whether they retire by the same way they came, or not: but commonly disperse in all directions, and would risk the involving their infantry in the same disorder, whilst the enemy would not fail to keep up a brisk and heavy fire, which would be the more destructive, from the impossibility of returning it.

Cavalry incorporated with infantry in line, looses all the advantage of its activity and motion: for if it leaves its position in the line, the whole order of battle is deranged, whilst that of the enemy, formed in the usual manner, in the rear of their infantry, or on the wings, is at liberty to move in every direction to seize every advantage, and to attack at pleasure, either the flank or rear. Should the incorporated cavalry quit the line to charge, the battalions would be left with too large intervals, which the enemy would not fail to enter, and roll them up by the flanks: and should the cavalry wait in line the charge of the enemy, their defeat is certain, as no cavalry at rest can sustain the shock of one in motion, and the battalions would also be subject to the same inconvenience as in the former case.

At a time when there were but few fire-arms, particularly cannon, when cavalry marched up to the attack at a walk, or at most at a trot; this combination might have been practicable, or even useful, as it is at this time against irregular troops, but in any other case it is very dangerous, and subjects the troops who adopt it to a certainty of being defeated, and almost annihilated, without even a chance of making an honourable resistance: Those two natures of troops thus mixed, embarrass, instead of protecting each other, the essence of the one being the sword, combined with the rapidity of its movement: and the other, in the quantity and direction of its fire, the steady firmness of its movements, as well as precision and order.

It is difficult to comprehend what is related by some of the old military authors, that in the midst of an action, the cavaliers alight to fight sword in hand: this appears romantic, at least in our time no person will be easily prevailed upon to imitate their example.

C H A P. XL

Of the Service proper to Cavalry.

AGREEABLE to the institution of this nature of troops, the heavy cavalry, or those mounted upon large horses, and armed for the defensive, (such as cuirassiers) ought to serve in the first line of the order of battle, and for this service they are generally reserved, being rarely employed elsewhere; the height and weight of both man and horse, give a decided superiority in the charge, supposing it to be simply given straight forward, squadron against squadron, with equal impetuosity: In a course of 600 paces, a good German horse, in condition, will get before a Polish, Tartar, or other horse of that description: but if the course is continued to a greater distance, the latter will regain its ground, leave the other behind, and continue in wind for a much longer time: and should the heavy horse be forced a little beyond his wind, he becomes insensible to the bit and spur, and looses all his activity, which is the reason that cuirassiers are never employed on any other occasion than a regular battle. The post of the dragoons is regularly in the second line, except when there is a deficiency of cuirassiers, or other heavy cavalry, for the first. The Austrians have formerly, on some occasions, placed a regiment of dragoons on each wing of cavalry, even in the first line, and this they seemed to do, without any good reason, or necessity, and when they had cuirassiers enough to place some in the second line.

A line of troops certainly ought not to be weaker on its flanks than in the centre, nor the charge of less effect or weight; if by this disposition the Austrians intended that the dragoons should be at hand to gain the enemy's flank, those dragoons were as little proper for that, as the cuirassiers, their horses being equally heavy; nor is this the most advantageous disposition for that purpose, as has been already mentioned.

Hussars are placed upon the extremities of wings; and in the reserve, they are also employed in skirmishing, more than any other nature of troops; dragoons are the medium between heavy cavalry and that which is properly called light, and they act occasionally with one or the other.

The Prussian Hussars have shewn that they are equally capable of every nature of service. In regular battles they have rendered the service of cuirassiers; they never hesitated to attack in close squadron, whatever they have met with, which was never known before them, to have been done by the Hussars of any other nation; it being the general opinion, and even Hussars themselves, in those services, do not conceive that nature of arm to be proper to act in line, nor do they scarcely ever make their appearance during an action, which could originate only from the antient prejudice that the goodness of cavalry consisted, exclusively in the height of the man and horse. The cavaliers, however, of Gustavus Adolphus, and Charles XII. were never mounted upon any other than Swedish, Finland, or Livonian nags, (or poneys) and nevertheless performed wonders.

According to the maxims of the Count de Saxe, the cuirassiers ought never to quit the camp, and of course never see the enemy, except on the day of battle: The King of Prussia, with more reason, thought differently. No cavalry can be good that has not frequent occasions to exercise their address and courage against the enemy: for which reason, the cuirassiers, as well as others, ought frequently to be commanded on detachments, provided it is not at too great a distance, nor so frequent as to harass the horses; they should be allowed to skirmish often with the enemy's, detachments, which will render them quick, bold, and dexterous in the management of their horses, and their arms. Austrians sometimes have incorporated dragoons, and cuirassiers, in the same detachment, by alternate files: This has a disagreeable effect upon the eye, besides which, it is much better that each troop should act distinctly under the command of their own officers, whom they have been accustomed to obey, and who is acquainted with the peculiar routine, and customs, of their respective regiments, as the nature and service of which are so widely different. Sometimes the Austrians have thus incorporated German cuirassiers, with Flemish dragoons, who could not speak the same language, nor understand each other. The King of Prussia never permitted this kind of combination.

C H A P. XII.

Particular Observations relative to Cavalry.


THERE are some few situations in which regular cavalry must act contrary to what is allowed to be the essence of that arm ; as for instance : in presence of a numerous corps of irregular light cavalry, as Hussars, Tartars, &c. it would be at the risk of their total annihilation, to charge forward with such impetuosity as to risk being in disorder, or the squadron dispersed for a moment : But the arm, which in such instance might be used with the greatest advantage, and effect, is the carbine, and pistols, as such troops always stand in the greatest awe of them, and keep at a very respectable distance. The greatest care should be taken never to charge troops of that description, in line, or close squadron, except when they should happen to be in such a position as to be incapable of avoiding it by dispersing, as in a défilé, or other enclosed situation.

An army moving forward towards the enemy, usually meets with several detachments of his troops upon the line of march, some of whom will attempt to pass between the columns to throw them into disorder ; to obviate this inconvenience, detachments of Hussars are commonly posted at the head of each of the columns, and to those are joined some chasseurs, or marksmen, with rifle carbines, and ammufetes, who are, on no account, to separate themselves from them.

A few

A few Hussars are likewise detached to serve as flankers: these must disperse and extend themselves to reconnoitre and examine every thing on the right and left, and between the columns; and some Hussars are likewise to be posted in the rear of the chasseurs for their protection, and always to remain within 150 paces of them; this disposition will effectually prevent the enemy's detachments from insinuating themselves between the columns, and throwing them into confusion, by firing upon the divisions on their march, as it has frequently happened where such precautions have been neglected.

If the line of march of the columns is at any considerable distance from each other, some squadrons must march in the intermediate space, to preserve a free communication, as well as to prevent parties of the enemy from taking the advantage of their separation. In a plain country these squadrons should not march at the height of the heads of the column, but retire as it were in echiquier, by which disposition they will at the same time secure their own flanks, and be enabled to fall upon those of the enemy who might attempt to attack the flanks of the divisions, which form the heads of the columns. See the plan.



It was in this order the Prussians marched, at Frankfort, the enemy's coffacks stuck to the Hussars at the heads of the columns, like swarms of flies, but the King ordered the Hussars to march in squadrons, as close as cuirassiers. When squadrons preserve this compact formation, such
troops

troops must of necessity give place ; on those occasions chaffeurs are of the greatest importance, because all the eastern and light cavalry in general, keep at a respectable distance from the range of their carbines. It is certain, that Hussars will sometimes keep up a scattered fire for a whole day, with very little effect, this is however frequently unavoidable, particularly in harrassing or being harrassed, &c. the flankers must, in this case, be detached, to keep the enemy at a distance, who would otherwise fire upon the body of the detachment, and incommode it very much : for it is much easier to touch a squadron, than a single Hussar in continual motion ; in this, Hussars have great advantage over heavy cavalry, particularly when they have not been practised to this kind of service. In a march of ten German miles, supposing it to be commenced with equal numbers, the Hussars would certainly be the victors. In the open country they would very much harrass and dishearten heavy cavalry by continual skirmishing, and hanging upon their flanks and rear, which would be very much increased, if they should be provoked to charge, even if they should be so fortunate as not to be in disorder after it : but in such a length of march, there must at last be some defilé, or other obstacle, which would oblige this heavy cavalry, already much fatigued, to break off ; and this is the moment, for the light troops to act with the greatest vigour, and by continual pressing upon them in such situations, in which they can neither prevent being attacked, nor take their revenge, they will at length lose confidence ; and the instant they either charge or disperse, they are equally certain of being vanquished.

To remedy this disadvantage the King of Prussia directed all his cuirassiers to be practised to the Hussar exercises, which was certainly

so far useful : but their horses are not proper for such light and active service.

Seydlitz, whose regiment ought, for the useful, to serve as a model for all the cavalry in the universe ; allowed, that in a march of length he should not be able, with his whole regiment, to resist 600 good Hussars. All heavy cavalry who lose confidence, or disperse, in presence of light, is lost ; if they determine, by one great effort, to extricate themselves, at least for some time : those retreat swiftly, *a la debandade*, in all directions. If the cuirassiers halt, and sound the *appel*, or rally, the Hussars do the same, and re-commence their skirmishing ; in short, whether they move forward, or remain upon their ground, they must equally suffer and be harrassed. Prussian Hussars indeed do not always stand upon so much ceremony, but fall upon an arrear guard, or other corps in close squadron, without hesitation, and with the greatest effect.


General Werner, with 700 Hussars, completely destroyed the dragoons of the Arch Duke Joseph, afterwards Emperor, by skirmishing, harrassing, and hanging upon their flanks, and rear, in the manner above described ; those dragoons were commanded by General Caramelli.

If during a battle, a wing of cavalry should be detached on some particular service, to turn a flank of the enemy, to reinforce the opposite wing, or any part of the line, &c. the General commanding it should, nevertheless, take care to leave a few squadrons to cover the flanks of the line, from which his wing is removed ; for whatever precautions the infantry, or even artillery may take, by forming the oblong square, or flank firing, their position will be very defective, without


without a certain proportion of cavalry. When a flank is formed by some battalions fronting outward, the few squadrons which have been left, should place themselves in the prolongation of the second line, by which they will be enabled to fall upon the flank of any thing which might be advised, to attack the flank of their first line at the same time that the flanking battalions would attack them in front.



But if the infantry should not have their flanks thus closed, the squadrons should then place themselves beyond the flanks, and opposite to the intervals between the two lines, which will more effectually protect the flank of the first line than if they were formed upon it.



If there were squadrons enough to place others, at the same time, without, and in echelon in the rear of these, the position would be yet more perfect.



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It is a general maxim, never to leave, on any account whatever, the flanks of infantry entirely without cavalry. At Rosback, Seydlitz left only the grand guards, on the right of the lines.

If between the lines of infantry, of an army formed in order of battle, there should happen to be a rising ground, trees, &c. or any thing sufficient to mask a few squadrons from the sight of the enemy, and not too much exposed to their fire, such an advantage must not be omitted, it will be of the utmost importance, should the first line be broken, and give way; these fresh squadrons, by their sudden appearance, will effectually check the advancing enemy, and by giving time to the second line to move forward, restore the success of the action. On the contrary, should the first line succeed in throwing the enemy's battalions into disorder, these squadrons will be ready to advance rapidly upon them, and complete their defeat.

The Spanish dragoons, of Sagorté, performed this manœuvre, at Campo Santo, and by it, totally defeated the Austrian and Piedmontese cavalry, and it was this success alone which prevented the complete annihilation of the Spanish infantry, on that day, which however suffered very considerably, because the Duke of Artrisko, who commanded the Spanish cavalry, pursued with the whole of his, that of the enemy, which he had just defeated, instead of reserving some of the squadrons to fall upon the flanks and rear of their infantry; and by this mistake, although he so gloriously defeated the enemy's cavalry, he was the cause of the loss of the battle.

Several officers who served with the Spaniards, in Portugal, have declared that their cavalry is, at this time, totally unacquainted with the service,
that

they neglected, either through ignorance, or ill will, the most favourable opportunities of decided advantages; the only point of service they seemed to look upon as their duty, was to remain fixed to the same place, until it became their turn to retreat. The race of both men and horses, must, and have most furiously degenerated in that country.

In an open country, an active, brave, and well disciplined cavalry, will frequently decide the fate of a battle, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy's infantry, whether in number or quality, to that of the army to which they are attached. But to this effect the infantry must refuse the action, except by a distant fire of artillery, and a demonstration of moving forward, but without gaining too much ground, to avoid being too closely engaged, or encouraging the enemy to advance, this will give time to their own cavalry to charge and overset that of the enemy, and throw it in confusion upon their own infantry, which operation being seconded by the infantry, with vigour, will complete the defeat of the enemy's whole line.

C H A P. XIII.

Of wheeling by Divisions, and by Fours.

THIS article having been already mentioned in the regimental manœuvres, I should not have noticed it again, had not some persons, who pretend to be acquainted with the movements of cavalry, maintained that a squadron comes more readily about by wheeling by divisions, than by fours; this opinion can proceed only from either not having considered the subject, or that they are not what they imagine themselves to be.

First. The operation of coming to the right about, is performed in a much shorter time by fours, than by divisions.

Second. The horses hardly move from off their own ground, and the order of the squadron is not deranged by fours, as it is by divisions.

Third. It can be performed on any ground, without spare space, or intervals, either between the squadrons or upon the flanks, as the two horses on the right, and those on the left move into and occupy each others ground exactly; by the four moving upon their centre, the two right hand troopers retiring their horses a little, whilst the other two advance with theirs, until each fall into the others places.

Fourth.

Fourth. The squadrons occupy exactly the same ground, after having come to the right about, as they did before ; whereas by the same manœuvre, by divisions, every squadron, and of course the whole line, must gain ground a whole divisions length to the right.

Fifth. Because by wheeling by divisions the order of the squadron is wholly deranged, the flank becomes almost in the centre.

Sixth. Because a line en muraille cannot wheel by divisions without the right hand divisions moving out of the line, to make room for the others to wheel into, which is a dangerous operation, very irregular, and in many cases impracticable : whereas by fours it may be performed with regularity and precision, in any situation.

The Prussian regiment commands the performance of this manœuvre by fours, explains the manner in which it ought to be executed, and the aids to be employed.

As this manœuvre has been for time immemorial practised in the German armies, it is surprising that Mons. de Puisegur should have had no knowledge of it ; his pretended *Wieder Zurück*, has not been practised this century.

C H A P. XIV.

Of the Caracol, or wheeling the Regiment in Line.

THE King of Prussia formerly, in all his reviews, made ten, or even as many as twenty squadrons, wheel together in line, sometimes en muraille, at others with intervals of ten or twelve paces. Sometimes a regiment wheeled upon its centre; notwithstanding this authority, and that of Mons. Puisegur, who very earnestly recommends it, and was then in fashion; this manœuvre has, since that time, been universally exploded.

When this manœuvre is to be performed in line, or barrier, as it is sometimes called, one wing keeps the rein in hand, whilst the other turns full speed, as in the wheeling a single squadron, which is nevertheless very slow and difficult to perform; at present it is done with much more expedition and facility: the pivot squadron wheels at once, without attending at all to the others, and those move rapidly forwards, to fall into their places upon each others flank in succession, as they arrive into the alignement, by moving on the shortest line, and without forming any part of a circle. If they are wheeling to the right, they have no occasion to turn their eyes to the left, as when wheeling in line, or squadron, but only to look to the pivot; and to dress into
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the alignement by the preceding squadron. This manœuvre has the advantage of a certain number of squadrons being always ready for action, and those continually increafing until the whole has wheeled, and are in no risk of lofing their intervals.

The half wheel, is correctly performed by the counter march by divisions, which has none of the inconveniences of the wheeling en barriere, or line.

If a line of troops, or a regiment is to wheel or change front to the rear, the right hand squadron wheels to the right about, or half wheel, all the others to the right, quarter wheel; and march in the rear of it, and wheel up into line, as they arrive in fucceffion upon the left flank of each other.

C H A P. XV.

Of Rallying.

WHETHER cavalry has been successful, or the contrary, it is always more or less in disorder after a charge, and it is necessary to rally the squadrons as quickly as possible, by founding the appel ; this should be frequently practised at exercise, and those troopers who do not fall in with briskness and dispatch, should be punished. There are two methods of performing this manœuvre, the first and most common is, when the commanding officer, after having ordered the appel to be founded, remains in the rear ; and the troopers, so soon as they hear it, return and form upon the standard in his front ; this method is proper only when a few files have been detached from the flanks, to pursue, and skirmish with the enemy. But when the whole are to be rallied after a charge, the commanding officers of the squadrons, with the trumpeters, and standards, should continue to move forward, and gain the foremost of the scattered troopers. So soon as a few files are collected, they should continue to advance slowly, by which means the others will have much greater facility in joining them, and to fall into their places in the ranks, than if the troop remained upon its own ground in the rear, to wait for them to return to the standard ; which would, likewise very much retard the pursuit, and give the enemy time to reconnoitre, and rally in his turn ; besides many other very serious disadvantages.

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The King of Prussia first introduced the practice of rallying, advancing; the other method was formerly practised in his army, as well as in all others in Europe, but the superiority of that was immediately perceived, and has since been very frequently confirmed by experience.

On the day of Pentecost, in the year 1745, a smart action took place at Llandshut, in Silesia, between the Prussians and the Austrians, to oblige the latter to evacuate that province; the regiment to which the author belonged, was in the second line of the Prussian army: in approaching the village of Riechenersdorf, they perceived Colonel Soldau, in the first line, permitting the Austrian Hussars to file off quietly by the village, and retire: Seydlitz, Malakoufky, and the author of this essay, to whom this deliberate conduct was not agreeable, passed through the intervals of the first line, formed, and made a successful charge, pursued the enemy through the village, and were very near surrounding ten squadrons of Hussars with Prince Esterhazy, who commanded them, at the defilé of Faulbrük, which we were very well acquainted with; when Soldau perceiving that one of his squadrons had joined us, sounded the appel, or rally: this caused the whole of the Hussars to retire in disorder, and by this mistake, the enemy not only found themselves in security, but faced about, and followed them to the village, and the author himself was very near being taken: whereas, had the Hussars been practised to rally in advancing, this check would not have happened.

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However, the files first formed should always move slowly forward, to facilitate the falling in of the others to their places as they arrive.

The King of Prussia payed great attention to the appel, and if any regiment neglected, or were imperfect in it, he expressed the greatest dissatisfaction.



C H A P. XVI.

Various Observations upon Cavalry.

WELL disciplined cavalry should be formed to every kind of useful manœuvre, which is practicable in presence of an enemy, even if it should be required only once in ten campaigns.

It is very important that they should be particularly exercised to all the operations of cavalry, in an arrear guard. The Prussian Hussars have rarely attacked a rear guard, without success : but their enemies have never acted with similar energy, if we except General Tottleben, when he defeated that of General Goltz, near Weitzweig. If the Austrians had acted with more vigour, against the late Prince of Prussia, in the long retreat from Böhmisch Lippa, to Zittau, and Boutzen ; his army must have suffered much more considerably ; particularly when

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it decamped from Zittau. The author, who commanded the rear guard, during the whole of that march, was much surpris'd at being so little harrassed, and lost but very few troops by the operations of the enemy, but the misconduct of some of the general officers, caused a greater loss by desertion, than would have been sustained by the loss of a moderate battle.

In any country which is not entirely mountainous, a good corps of active cavalry, commanded by experienced officers, cannot fail to defeat an enemy's arrear guard: sooner or later a favourable opportunity, if carefully attended to, must present itself to strike a decisive blow. General Seydlitz, and the author, at that time both Majors, had this advantage near Zittau, by which they defeated the rear guard, commanded by Count Burghausen, in 1745. Another time the author had a like advantage over an arrear guard, commanded by General Brown, on the march, to succour the Saxons, near Schandau; he had not then with him, more than 400 Hussars, and both times attacked the enemy's infantry in the plain.

Defensive operations are always disadvantageous to cavalry; however well they may do their duty, manœuvring in retreat, they cannot avoid sooner or later meeting with a considerable check, if not a defeat; the carbine is the proper arm of defence, but they will not be able with it, entirely to restrain for any considerable time, any but such irregular light cavalry, as Tartars, and troops of that description; it is for this reason that an arrear guard should always be composed of infantry with field pieces, and chasseurs, as well as dragoons, hussars, &c. that each nature of troops may reciprocally support the other.

The cavalry will support the infantry and artillery in the plain, and the infantry cover the retreat of the cavalry, in defilés, or mountainous passes, and the chasseurs keep the enemy's flankers at a distance, in both places. A rear guard thus composed, with proper measures, will run as little risk of being harrassed in their retreat, as the nature of the operation will admit; except, by some gross oversight, they should allow themselves to be separated from the columns, and taken in the rear or flank. It is necessary to act with great precaution in mountains and woods, and other enclosed countries. It once happened that a detachment, commanded by the author, was very much harrassed by the enemy's croats on its march near Königgratz, in an enclosed country, very much intersected by deep ditches: but the detachment moved into the plain where the croats had the imprudence likewise to follow; the squadron faced suddenly to the right about, and in a moment sabred the greatest number of them in presence of the King.

It is certain that no cavalry unsupported by infantry, can be sure of making a good retreat of any length, in presence of other cavalry who do their duty.

All irregular cavalry have a great dread of fire-arms, and it is advantageous not to undeceive that of the enemy, with regard to the smallness of the effect of it from cavalry; therefore when they advance with their lances in the air, emitting their usual barbarous screams, they should be received with firmness, and the front rank level at them with the carbine, which when they perceive, before they arrive within sixty paces distance, they never fail to retreat with more precipitation than they advanced: a few shot only, from some good marksmen, should then be fired after them: for if a whole rank was to fire, and none of them be touched,

touched, which is not unlikely to happen, instead of confirming their respect for the fire of the carbine, it would shew them its weakness when made use of by cavalry, and their own advantage, which would make them more enterprising for the future ; the Prussians, by being too lavish of their carbine firing, emboldened the cossacks to a contempt of that fire, which at the commencement of the war they had dreaded very much ; but it is certain that this must have happened sooner or later, from the disproportion of numbers of the Prussian Hussars to the Russian light cavalry, of every species, which they had to oppose.

The Prussian Hussars were nearly exhausted with fatigue ; they were in continual motion from one enemy to another, in summer and winter, without ever being in quarters, or cantonments, which is so necessary for the re-establishment of troops, particularly cavalry ; every campaign the regiments were obliged to be almost renewed : no wonder then if the Hussars had frequently recourse to the carbine, of which the enemy's cossacks stood so much in awe, and by that means, on many occasions, to lessen the fatigues of the service.

A Peasant, or other recruit, was enlisted, cloathed, and exercised on foot, during eight days ; his horse was then given him, and he was immediately sent to join the regiment in actual service against the enemy. Without the assistance of our own cossacks, it would, after all, have been impossible for us to resist.

C H A P. XVII.

Of the Points of Alignement, of View, and of Appui.

THE point of alignement is any distant object serving as a direction, upon which to form the regiments into line, in order of battle; there is usually one chosen in the direction of each flank, remarkable buildings, woods, steeples, villages, &c. are proper objects for this purpose.

Points of appui are situations chosen for the position of wings of an army, by which they are covered, supported, and protected; sometimes only one wing has this advantage, but if they should be given to both, and more troops than sufficient to occupy the space between them in the first line, some battalions should be formed in interline: but if on the contrary, the points of appui should be at such distance from each other as to require more troops to occupy the space between them, the intervals must be closed up by some battalions from the second line, and those replaced from the corps de reserve; but should the army advance, and quit the points of appui, the lines, and corps de reserve, should resume their former disposition, if the ground and other circumstances will admit.

Points of appui are therefore any objects which tend to strengthen the wings appuied upon them, and if perfect, to render them inattackable by the enemy ; such as impassable marshes, or swampy grounds, lakes, and large pieces of water, deep ravines, and steep precipices, heights, &c. with works and cannon upon them, fortified villages, woods with abbatis in them, a military eye will discover some of these objects, and apply them with advantage, in almost every situation.

The points of view are objects selected in a line perpendicular to the front, and to serve as points of direction, upon which the line is to advance, to enable it to move in parallel lines directly forward without gaining ground to the right or left, or obliquing the line, which would expose one of the flanks to the enemy's fire.

Great accuracy is required in the selection of these points, that they may be chosen correctly perpendicular, and at proper distances from each other, that the battalions, or brigades, might not cross upon, or separate from each other upon converging or diverging lines.

Points of view are likewise made use of for the march of the army, in columns, towards the enemy, which requires equal accuracy, that they might preserve their proper distances for the battalions to deploy into line, and reform the order of battle.

The interline is a line of troops formed between the two lines of the army, but generally nearest to the first ; from whence they are taken for want of space, or other reasons, and into which they reform so soon as those reasons cease.

When mention is made of an army, in order of battle, it is said the right or left wing of cavalry ; and simply the right or left of infantry.

The antient idea that it was advantageous for an army to remain in a permanent position, and receive the attack, where villages happened to be situated in its front, is at present entirely exploded. Such villages were formerly fortified in haste, filled with artillery and infantry, and obstinately defended, and supported to the last extremity by the whole army ; and the village taken, the battle was lost : Neerwinde furnishes an example. At Ramalies, so soon as the French infantry was dislodged from the village, the cavalry could act, and the affair was soon decided. At Kesselsdorf, the Saxons not being able to re-enter it, the same thing ensued. In the war, in Flanders, the battles of the Count de Saxe were won by taking villages, which whether built of brick, or wood, would at present be no longer tenable, howitzer shells would soon set them on fire, or the great number of cannons would soon batter them, and dislodge the most resolute troops.

The affair at Leuthen, might seem to militate against this assertion, as we lost more men in the attack of it, than in all the rest of the action : but that is not the case, the Austrians entered that village during the action, and it was not placed in their front, but between the two lines ; it was, I believe, their reserve, which had moved from the right towards the left, and entered just as our troops approached it, and what very much increased the strength of it was, an elevated church yard, with thick walls, like a kind of citadel, and very strong. However, if we had waited for the heavy cannon, which were coming from the right, instead of persisting in carrying it by assault, we should have had it at a very cheap rate, notwithstanding the resolution with which it
was

was defended. At present villages are more avoided than searched after, because it is very disadvantageous for an army to be embarrassed in its movements; they are generally set on fire, to prevent the enemy taking any advantage of them.

When armies had but few cannon, and no howitzers, the attack of a village was an important and difficult operation.

When a village happens to be situated in so strong a position as that of Berghen, near Frankfort, it might however well merit being defended and supported. When that had been well reconnoitred by Prince Ferdinand, I am assured he determined not to attack it, but was engaged in that action, by the imprudent courage of Prince Issembourg, who was killed in the attack.

It is commonly at the choice of the General, either to force the village with his artillery alone, or to mask it with a few troops, and direct his attacks elsewhere: should the remainder of their army be defeated, or obliged to retreat, it will be next to impossible for those in the village to extricate themselves, and will be obliged to surrender, without having performed the least service; this happened to the French, at Höckstädt.

A General who would at present embarrass his movements, by supporting a village in his front, would almost certainly ensure his own defeat, and the loss of the troops posted in it.

The King of Prussia, whose system was always to attack, would not suffer ground to be broken in front of his positions; it was with great difficulty

ficulty that he would permit a few fleethes to be thrown up to cover the guards of infantry.

He frequently repeated that no good was to be expected from that army which was cramped in its movements, as it would prevent them from manœuvring, or taking advantage of the mistakes or faults of the enemy.

What are we to think of those battles where a whole army falls out of an intricate position, by one single avenue, and falls unexpectedly upon that which is marching to attack it; but that they are of a piece with those immense towers of stone which were advanced upon rollers, to the attack of fortified places; and with those corbeaux, or crows of iron, which caught the vessels up out of the sea, and shook them to pieces; or the ballistas which projected whole rocks with as much precision as we throw shells from mortars.

There are some occasions in which it is necessary for an army to intrench; particularly when by the great superiority of numbers of the enemy, it is reduced to the defensive: as the King of Prussia was before Schweidnitz, when it was invested by the combined armies of Austria, and Russia. In such cases the cavalry is always encamped in the rear of the infantry, covered as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, and if time will admit, large epaulments thrown up in their front, with wide intervals, that the squadrons might be enabled to advance freely through them.

The cavalry might even be allowed to dismount, if it should happen to be intrenched in the rear of a position subject to be briskly cannonaded,
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for nothing disheartens troops so much as to be exposed to suffer without being enabled to take their revenge, or being of any service.

Active light cavalry, though they might not be able to support the charge of compact squadrons of heavy horse, yet they will not be in danger of suffering considerably by being defeated by them; the lightness and activity of their horses will enable them to disperse in all directions with such rapidity, that the heavy squadrons might as well pursue a flight of sparrows, as such alert and active horse; and with the same briskness and facility, they will be enabled suddenly to rally; and by continually hovering round them, sooner or later find an opportunity to take their revenge; whereas heavy cavalry, in similar circumstances, or once separated and dispersed, are in the greatest danger of being totally destroyed.

The attempt to rally routed cavalry, whilst pursued close by the enemy, is generally found to be fruitless; every one cries halt, but no one ceases to fly; and indeed those who in such circumstances should have courage enough to wait for the enemy, would only be the victims of their temerity; therefore before it is attempted to rally routed cavalry, they should be allowed to gain a considerable distance from the enemy, which they would soon do, for the enemy advancing in regular order, cannot move with so much speed.

The most distant troopers should be the first formed, should it be ten or twelve files only: and then, by continuing slowly to retreat, the rest, as they arrive, will rapidly augment the troop.

For this reason it would be a fatal experiment to attempt to face about with the trainers, in a complete derout. When the commanding officer cannot prevent the total disperſion of his ſquadron, nor ſucceed in keeping any ſmall number of them together, in order to cover the retreat; in theſe circumſtances, it may be the duty of ſuch commanding officer to be amongſt the laſt who diſband; yet it certainly is not ſo for him to be the laſt trainer in the derout, but ſo ſoon as he perceives it to be totally unavoidable, and complete, he ſhould clap ſpurs to his horſe, and gallop to ſuch a diſtance as he might think will enable him to rally, and reform a troop before the enemy will be enabled to come up with them.

Thus the moſt diſtant being firſt rallied, and continue to move ſlowly, the whole will, in a very ſhort time, be regularly reformed, without riſk or confuſion; and be ready, by the time the enemy's ſquadrons come up with them, to check the ardour of his purſuit; and even perhaps to take their revenge, and ſend them in their turn to the right about, if they ſhould have neglected to perform their purſuit in regular order.

C II A P. XVIII.

Of the Alignment of Cavalry.

IN open order, the subaltern officers dress to the right, or left, upon the points of alignment, with the heads of their horses correctly upon the line; the heads of the troopers horses of the first rank should be just clear of the croup of theirs; the commanding officer of the squadron posts himself at four paces in front of the Subalterns line: but on the words, *close ranks*, the Subalterns fall back upon the flanks, or into the rear, to their posts, except two, who remain (when there are Subalterns enough to admit of it) near the commanding officer in the front, and the one who closes the squadron. The commanding officer then, reins back, close to the front rank, in the line quitted by the Subalterns, and marks the alignment. The superior officers are more advanced, that they might be enabled to see along the front of the whole line, and they dress with each other: but those, except on the Parade, ought not to have any fixed post; the Subaltern officers on the flanks, must be very attentive to the movements of the commanding officer of the squadron, because the alignment is always marked by him, and be careful to dress correctly with each other, as it is upon them the squadron is formed, when there are intervals between them; for if there are none, or the line is formed en murialle, the whole dress to the right, or left; or squadron of direction, as commanded.

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The King of Prussia formerly insisted upon the squadrons dressing by their centres, and great confusion resulted from it, so much, that when the troops were manœuvring together at the reviews, the General officers, who were anxious about the appearance and regularity of the regiments, were obliged to evade that command, and make the squadrons dress by the right, though the King always believed them to dress by the centre.

It is more difficult for cavalry to avoid breaking the line in marching, than infantry; these might march with equal pace, all the soldiers lifting their feet at the same time, and setting them down the same, but it never entered the imagination of any person to exact the same from horses.

Cavalry is sometimes formed into three or four, or even more lines; but far from being rendered of more effect, it is very much weakened by that disposition: the two first are the only ones which can be employed against the enemy, and if those are defeated, they never fail to throw the others into disorder in their retreat; and in such a mass it is impossible, in presence of the enemy, to re-establish order and regularity; therefore it is not unworthy of being repeated, that thirty squadrons in two lines, is equal to ninety in six; and with this advantage: that should the disposition in two lines be repulsed, it is very easy to rally them, which is impossible for the others to do, if their two first lines should have a similar misfortune.

Marquis de Sylva recommends it as a good disposition to cover the flanks of an army with light troops: but nothing can be more ridiculous than

than to pretend to cover the flanks of an army, which is to receive the attack, with light troops, and particularly against the Turks. Light troops are, no doubt, in their proper place when upon the flanks : but this is only upon the supposition of that army being the assailant, or that it is encamped; for in any other situation, the enemy's first attacks would be directed against them, and quickly make them quit their position, and uncover the flank of the army which they were intended to protect; as Count Saxe performed at Laufeldt, and the King of Prussia, at Colin; where his first operation was, to dislodge the corps commanded by Nadasdy, posted on the right of Daun's army.

It is a deception, to imagine the flanks of an army are really covered by prolonging its front; since a line, however extensive it might be, will always have flanks; and if it is in a defensive or permanent position, it will be very difficult to cover them by the means of troops; as was experienced at Leuthen. A flank closed with troops only, is always weak, and liable to be turned. The flank of an army, in a permanent and defensive position, ought therefore always to be covered by natural obstacles, or works. Sylva pretends that the flanks of an army, acting against the Turks, should be covered by light cavalry, which would be an excellent breakfast for those muselmans, as I have had occasion to observe more particularly elsewhere.

By what has been just mentioned, it is likewise easy to judge of the advantage the attacking army has, over that which remains in its position to receive the attack; especially in the present time, when such large trains of artillery are employed.

The army which determines to maintain a permanent position, must, at least, be so strongly posted, behind a river, &c. as to render it impracticable for an enemy to attack either its front or flanks, except with very great disadvantage; otherwise he will, sooner or later, find some point where he will not fail to open himself a passage, by the superiority of the quantity of heavy artillery, which he will always have it in his power to bring upon the point he has determined to attack; as finding it, without doubt, to be the weakest.



C H A P. XIX.

Remarks upon the Cavalry of the 15th and 16th Centuries, compared with the present.

IT has been observed that it is by serving in the light horse, that the military science is most effectually acquired, and it is, consequently, in that which an officer ought to commence his military career, as well at present, as in the time of Brantome, who mentions, that in his time, officers of the first families began by serving in the light horse, as in a corps which was most frequently engaged with the enemy; that author is, without doubt, the one who has left us the most clear and distinct memoirs of the manner of making war in his time. Paul Jove, Bishop of Côme, throws great light upon the manner of arming and equipping of





Barbarian









Asiatic Tamar.

of cavalry, in the 15th and 16th centuries, and as his works are not very common, I will quote a few words, which are apropos to our present subject from them.

“ The Gens d’Arms were armed complete, or cap-a-pied, from head to foot ; the armour for the horse was made of boiled leather. The French horses were without ears, and without manes, and the German without tails. The offensive arms were, the fluted lance, a long sword, a masse d’arms, or pole-axe ; each of the Gens d’Arms, or Knights, had three horses for themselves, a Page d’Arms, or Esquire, and two valets, all mounted, and who always fought near, or succoured and supported their master, and were called siefemen of succour, very much resembling the Spahis, Sayms, and Timars of the Turks. The lancers were upon nearly the same footing, but each of those were accompanied by nine horsemen : thus, when we read, that in such an action there were an hundred lances, it is to be understood there were a thousand horse. The great officers, Princes, and Generals, had also their standards, which were carried always before them, as it continues to be practised among the Turks to this time.

The light horse had likewise their defensive armour, but not so heavy as that of the Gens d’Arms, or Knights : their arms of offence were bows and long arrows, besides swords, and pole-axes, with which they used to dispatch those whom the knights had unhorsed. It was in the 15th century that the Albaniens first appeared in the Venetian armies : other nations afterwards adopted that species of troops, they were called Greek cavalry ; and were composed of natives of the Levant, Greeks, Albaniens, Bosniacks, Croats, Dalmatiens, and Macedonians, or Turkish Arnauts ; they did not bear any defensive armour, and for

arms

arms, only javelins, and cimeters, or sabres very much curved, and pole-axes, all of which are still in common use in the Turkish cavalry; the Albanians served in the field exactly similar to the Hussars at this present time; and if they had the good fortune to throw the Gens d'Arms into a little disorder, they soon made a great carnage amongst them, because being hand to hand pell mell with them, those heavy horsemen could make no use of their lances, or scarcely move themselves. One fact occurs in the military history of those times, which appears almost incredible, but is nevertheless very certain, which is, that the Swiss foot, armed simply with pikes and halberds, attacked and defeated the Gens d'Armery, in the plain, and particularly at Novarre, where the French Gens d'Armes were almost entirely destroyed; this makes me doubt very much that extraordinary valour which has been frequently attributed to them.

In the present time, when a numerous train of artillery is brought into action, when all the infantry are armed with firelocks and bayonets, the Gens d'Armes dare not attack, but remain, even on a plain, inactive, in presence of other cavalry, unless attacked by them.

It was Francis I. who first adopted Arquebussiers on horseback: they were then, what our dragoons are now, and in very high estimation, Mons. Brantome speaks thus of those of M. de Strozzi.

This nobleman quitted Italy, and came into France to the King, at Maroles, with the finest company that ever was beheld; it consisted of 200 Arquebussiers, on horseback, the best mounted, best equipped, and best appointed, that it was possible to see: there was not one of them who had not two horses, which were, at that time, called cavalins,

cavalins, which were light, handsome, and well proportioned ; their bits, and sleeves of mail, which were then worn, very strong ; their also Arquebusses and furniture were very much gilt with gold ; and they would frequently run with the light horse, and racers, to almost enraging of them ; sometimes they made use of the pike, of the bourginotte, and of the coralet gilt, as occasion required : but what was most admirable, they were all old captains, formed by serving under the banners of that great captain John of Medicis, and had almost all belonged to him ; infomuch, that when it was required to dismount and serve on foot, there was no need of the word of command to form them into the order of battle ; for of themselves they were so well arranged, from having been so perfectly exercised, that no person could discover any thing to find fault with."

Thus it appears these mounted Arquebussiers were real dragoons, and like them of the double service of horse and foot, as occasion required.

The origin of the French light horse, was in imitation of the Venetian Albaniens, and like them in the middle of the 15th century, they adopted the cuirass, which they continue to use to the present time, although the Albaniens soon experienced the inconveniency of, and rejected it. It appears by Buffy Rabutin, that the French light horse continued to be called Albanien cavalry, until the beginning of this century ; notwithstanding they were very heavy and awkwardly accoutred, and their numbers considerably encreased.

Philip de Commines mentions, that in his time, when the French and Venetians blockaded Verona, defended by the troops of the Emperor Maximillian; a party of Albaniens sallied from the place and skirmished with the French Gens d'Arms, and that each Albanian took one of the Gens d'Arms prisoner, and led him into the town in triumph: At present this would not appear so very extraordinary, as a single Hussar, or Cossack, has frequently taken two cuirassiers in one day.

Hussars are a very ancient species of troops: but were, till lately, little known out of Hungary; they were, what might be called according to the ancient language, light harness. Louis, King of France, had some of them in his army, at the battle of Mohacs, where he lost his life, but they had defensive armour: for the Hungarians have also had their Gens d'Arms, as well as other nations.

Francis I. as has been mentioned, was disgusted with his cavalry, after the battle of Novarre; conceiving them not to be of any effect, against infantry armed with pikes, and arquebusses; the latter, however, were but little known amongst the Swiss. He was the first that formed legions of French infantry, in which the nobility enrolled with avidity; and the cavalry was entirely neglected, and degenerated to such a degree, as to render it necessary to take some German regiments into their pay; these were distinguished by the name of Reuters, and were always esteemed beyond their own, particularly the Weimarienne.

The King of Prussia has demonstrated to the world, the important advantage resulting from a proper proportion of well disciplined good cavalry, in all the operations of war; and that arm appears, in its turn, to be regaining the superiority.

The

The Austrians have never ceased to maintain a numerous corps of cavalry in their service, the ostensible reason for which, has been the neighbourhood of the Turks ; but they do not seem, even to the present time, to have adopted that active, vigorous, and decided system of manœuvring, so essential to the operations of cavalry ; and in which its superiority and advantage principally consists.

A long succession of active campaigns very much reduces the quality, as well as the strength, of regiments of infantry ; whereas in similar circumstances cavalry continue every day to improve ; unless whole regiments perish, as it happened to several Prussian ones, at Maxen. By being frequently at blows with the enemy, they acquire a firmness, boldness, and address, which cannot be by any other means infused into them ; and is absolutely impossible to be done in time of peace : But when the infantry come to blows with the enemy, the loss is generally so considerable, that by the end of the second and third campaign, none of those who made the first, remain ; to profit by the lessons it afforded, or by their experience set an example to the young soldiers arrived to complete the companies : but generally by that time the regiments will consist almost entirely of recruits.

Philip de Comines mentions, that in his time the troops surrounded their encampments with waggons, and other spare carriages ; and that it was the duty of the Gens d'Arms, to defend them on foot, as well as the breach, in case of an assault in the defence of fortified places.

F I N I S.

NOTE.

ALTHOUGH the translator has studiously avoided touching upon any thing which related to himself: yet, since this work was printed, it having been insinuated, that an officer, not regularly belonging to the cavalry, was not eligible to undertake a work similar to the present; the translator trusts he might, without vanity, be permitted to observe, as one excuse amongst many others, for his presuming to do so, is, his having been always very partial to that nature of troops (of which the present translation is an instance,) and having had many opportunities, (though not regularly in the cavalry) of acquiring some little experience in it, whilst in the chief command of an army in Flanders, to which several excellent regiments of cavalry were attached; and having, on more than one occasion, charged with success with them; is, he presumes, a sufficient apology for his having undertaken the translation of a work like the present, that requires no particular talents, and which he might very well have performed, had no such occasions occurred. Another excuse that he conceives to be equally valable is, that it has never been hitherto performed, although generally allowed by the best cavalry officers, to be very useful and requisite.

Directions for placing the Plates.

TITLE PAGE, Light Dragoon Officer.	
<i>Plate.</i>	<i>Page.</i>
1 to face	1. Huffar Officer.
4, 3, 15 —	2. Cuirassier, Heavy Dragoon, Barbary Moor.
7, 8, 9 —	4. Austrian Huffar, Hungarian Huffar, Bavarian Light Dragoon.
13 —	6. Hulan.
5, 12 —	7. Spahi, and Tartar.
22, 21, 2, 10, —	25. Royal Horse Guard, Heavy British Dragoon, British Light Dragoon, Yeomanry Cavalry.
19 —	28. Moorish Horse.
20 —	30. Hulan Trotting.
11, 18 —	46. Light Dragoon charging, Front Rank do.
20* —	62. First Manœuvre.
21* —	64. Second do.
22* —	68. Third do.
23* —	76. Fourth do. Cavalry attack of Infantry.
24* —	82. Fifth do.
23 —	118. Ancient Armour.
16, 17, 6, 14, 24 —	119. Bostangi, Arnaut, Bosniac, Sayim, and Asiatic Timar.

